Letter from The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue

Date of Publication: 17 July 2003



For the last 17 years, parts of northern Uganda, predominantly those
inhabited by the Acholi ethnic community within Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader
districts, have been caught up in a devastating rebellion fought between
the so-called Lords Resistance Army (LRA) - led by former Catholic
catechist Joseph Kony - and the Museveni government and the Ugandan army
(the Ugandan People's Defence Force or UPDF). The extent of this unrest
can be measured by the fact that up to 800,000 people have been
displaced by rebel activity or forcibly relocated by the Ugandan army.
Gulu hosts the bulk of these internally displaced persons (IDPs),
estimated at about 400,000, and in Kitgum camps have spontaneously
emerged to accommodate some 100,000 IDPs.(1)

Having made considerable headway in restoring and enhancing its
diplomatic relations with the rest of the world, Sudan has for several
years also been eager to normalise its relationship with Uganda.(2) It
is a matter of record that the Museveni regime has long supported the
Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), both
politically and militarily. The military assistance over the years has
been considerable, ranging from logistically assisting with the movement
of SPLA mechanised regiments into Sudan in 1989, the provision of rear-
bases and weapons through to the use of Ugandan air force helicopters in
support of SPLA operations. Direct Ugandan military involvement has also
included the deployment of brigade sized UPDF units inside Sudan.(3)
After years of denying such military assistance, testimony before the
Ugandan parliament itself revealed the close relationship between the
Ugandan army and the SPLA, including direct supplies of weapons.(4) As a
response to this, Sudan had lent some assistance to the LRA. In its
endeavours to restore its relations with Uganda, in 2001 Sudan cut
whatever links it had with the LRA and signed an agreement in March 2002
which, in an unprecedented act of faith, allowed the Ugandan military to
enter Sudanese sovereign territory and attack the Ugandan rebels.(5)
This was to be in return for the SPLA not being allowed to operate in
and from, or to be assisted by, Uganda

The Ugandan military operation was to be called "Operation Iron Fist",
and was aimed at LRA bases in the huge, lawless expanses of southern
Sudan. The operation included allowing the UPDF to build security roads
in southern Sudan.(6) The Ugandan government initially said they only
needed until April 2002 to destroy the rebels.(7) This was then extended
for a month at Kampala's request.(8) In July it was then extended once
again.(9) In November 2002, the Sudanese government agreed to a further
extension.(10) And in February, Khartoum agreed to yet another extension
until May 2002.(11) The Sudanese have also paid a heavy price for its
cooperation with Uganda. Many Sudanese soldiers were killed in anti-LRA
operations, and hundreds of Sudanese civilians also subsequently died in
rebel attacks on their villages.(12)

Museveni Loses Face in Uganda and Internationally

It was claimed that Operation Iron Fist would finish the LRA once and
for all. As early as March 2002, the Ugandan army claimed to have
defeated the LRA.(13) In July the army stated that rebel activity had
dropped to almost zero.(14) It was also claimed by the Ugandan army that
they had contained the rebellion in northern Uganda.(15) In August 2002,
yet again Museveni publicly "donned military fatigues" and announced he
was personally supervising the destruction of the LRA.(16) The Ugandan
Defence Minister declared that "we have cornered Kony".(17) Major-
General James Kazini, the Ugandan military commander publicly stated in
May 2002: "You call me on December 31; if Kony is still alive I will
resign."(18) Yet, despite having cost a quarter of a billion dollars -
two and a half times Uganda's annual military budget - it soon became
clear that Museveni's Operation Iron Fist had not destroyed the LRA.(19)
'Africa Confidential' noted that the UPDF's failure in Sudan was
"costly" and that the Ugandan army had sustained hundreds of
casualties.(20) 'Africa Confidential' stated: "these failures should be
blamed on the ruling military triumvirate: UPDF Commander General James
Kazini; sometime UPDF Commander in northern Uganda, Lieutenant Gen.
Salim Saleh; and President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni himself. The apex
shows little sign of contrition."(21) Instead they blamed Sudan. Having
publicly failed - as the result of military incompetence and ill-
founded arrogance - to crush the LRA, Museveni then claimed that this
failure was because Sudan had continued to assist the Lords Resistance
Army. Khartoum has angrily denied these assertions stating that "it is
mere propaganda by those with an interest in derailing the peace process
between the two governments. When we took action to fight the LRA
alongside Uganda, it was a clear and strong commitment."(22) It is a
matter of record that Sudan has done everything asked of it by the
Ugandan regime, up to and including deploying Sudanese forces in anti-
LRA operations.(23)

The simple fact is that the Ugandan army's performance was dismal.
Indeed, there were subsequent reports that in many cases the Ugandan
army simply dropped its weapons and fled the battle.(24) It is also well
known that there is major, systemic corruption within the army and
defence ministry, with, amongst other things, thousands of "ghost"
soldiers being carried on divisional payrolls.(25) This may also have
effected the efficiency and demoralisation of the Ugandan army.

Museveni has been stung by unprecedented criticism in the Ugandan
parliament that the army was doing nothing to end the insurgency in
northern Uganda.(26) The Uganda parliament publicly demonstrated its
lack of little faith in the Ugandan military in its request that the
government engage South African mercenaries in the conflict against the
LRA. This deeply embarrassed Museveni, who stated - quite correctly -
that it showed "a lack of confidence in our own army".(27) Ugandan radio
station talk shows have also been inundated with criticism of Museveni
and the army.(28)

Museveni's operations were militarily inept, not having foreseen that
guerrillas, when attacked, will fragment and regroup or refocus
elsewhere. This is precisely what the LRA forces did.

There had been scepticism from the very outset about the ability of
Operation Iron Fist to defeat the LRA. The British human rights group
African Rights noted that: "The most widely held view among the Acholi
is that the current military operation should not have taken place at
all. From their point of view, a crucial but delicate and complicated
exercise has been needlessly jeopardised in the search for a short-term
solution, which now risks deepening and prolonging the conflict."(29)
This is precisely what happened: the Ugandan rebels withdrew back into
northern Uganda and opened up new fronts in eastern Uganda. This was
something which any military strategist should have foreseen. It was
also something apparently unseen by Museveni.

Museveni's Excuses Fall Short

Museveni has also repeatedly justified his government's colossal
military budget by pointing to events in the north of Uganda, increasing
the budget by 20 percent in 1995. Ugandan defence spending in 1996 rose
by a further 36 percent. It has grown since. Despite this, Museveni
blamed his army's inability to defeat or even contain the LRA, on
military under-resourcing. In the wake of the Operation Iron Fist fiasco
he declared: "The country's insecurity has been lingering on because of
underspending on defence, which is a big mistake that will not be
repeated." He claimed that he was unable to defeat the insurgents
"because we do not have good military equipment."(30) Ugandan
parliamentarians were critical of this claim, arguing that the problems
"are not military but political". That his excuses are flimsy is
illustrated by the fact that the size of the Ugandan army is at an all-
time high at 52,000 men, organised into 18 battalions.(31) Ugandan
politicians such as Beti Kamya Turwomwe have challenged whether any
further military spending would defeat the rebellion: "The conflict is
not a question of money...It is not a question of military might or
funding...We need to go back to the drawing board and understand thedynamics of this war. We have gained nothing by hiding dirt under the
carpet. Otherwise we will be like the ostrich with its head in the

The Real Reason for Failure

The important Ugandan newspaper, 'New Vision', addressed the real
reasons for Museveni's inability to end the rebellion in northern
Uganda. In an analysis entitled "Why Army Has Failed to Uproot Kony
Rebellion", the newspaper stated that the LRA has a "supportive
population".(33) Ugandans themselves have grown tired of Museveni's
facile excuses - the 1,106 word article did not once mention Sudan as a
reason for the rebellion's continued existence. Another key Ugandan
newspaper, 'The Monitor', has also challenged Museveni's facile attempts
to divert blame for his own mistakes. In an editorial, the newspaper
noted that the most important question with regard to the northern
insurgency was "the political question - democracy and political
consensus at a wider national level."(34) The newspaper also pointed to
serious levels of corruption within the government and military. This
editorial also conspicuously failed to mention Sudan. In its analysis of
the conflict in northern Uganda, the Kenyan newspaper, 'The East
African', also documented how the war is spiralling out of control. It
also did not mention Sudan.(35)

Museveni is Blocking Peace

Many Ugandans believe that the war in northern Uganda continues because
Museveni wants it to continue. It has, for example, been reported that
"on local FM stations, some talk-show panellists and callers" have
suggested that "Museveni is deliberately provoking the conflict because
it benefits his political career in some inexplicable way."(36)
Observers have certainly noted that the attitude of the Ugandan military
is an obstacle to negotiating peace in northern Uganda. Bishop Ochola,
chairman of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI),
accused the military of sabotaging peace arrangements.(37) Carlos
Rodriguez, a Catholic missionary in Gulu and member of the Acholi
Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, criticised the government's military
methods against the LRA which, he argues, have led to the deaths of
innocent civilians and the abduction of children.

"The army tells us that they have killed rebels. But when you look at
the so-called rebels, most of them are women and children. We don't
think the solution is to kill the same people whom we have failed to
protect from the rebels in the first place...You don't use helicopter
gunships to kill guerrillas. You end up killing many innocent

In a 35-page report, entitled "Seventy Times Seven", published in May
2002, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative stated that "the
heavy UPDF deployment in Sudan and its all-out offensive against the LRA
seems to have silenced anybody advocating dialogue and reconciliation,
and given way to other voices."(39)

A delegation from Refugees International reported that "the widely held
sentiment by people in northern Uganda is that the government is not
committed to peace". They noted, for example, that "on one occasion when
religious leaders tried to meet with the LRA, they were ambushed by the
Ugandan military and accused of being rebel collaborators. The Ugandan
government, while publicly stating that it will negotiate, has shown
little real commitment to a peaceful solution and critics have gone so
far as to accuse it of sabotaging peace efforts."(40) The Civil Society
Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda, a coalition of 40 non-
governmental organisations working with civilians affected by the
conflict has said that any peace process should be "inclusive, based on
patient dialogue and on the search for consensus on underlying issues,
not fixed positions."(41) African Rights has also echoed the need for
consensus: "Disregard for the views of local people is a major reason
for the problems that have beset this [peace] initiative from the

Museveni has himself dismissed rebel attempts to initiate
ceasefires.(43) His response to a March 2003 LRA ceasefire call was to
state "there is no ceasefire".(44) He was heavily criticised by northern
parliamentarians who called on the government to think twice about this
as "we feel the rebels are serious".

Origins of the Conflict in Northern Uganda

Blaming the insurgency on Sudan also helps to mask the ethnic dimension
of the war, as outlined in an article in 'The Online Journal of Peace
and Conflict Resolution': "According to Museveni... the initial issue or
reason for the conflict was that the Acholi community was deprived of
their ability to get rich off the looting of all other Ugandans."(45)
The article quoted Museveni as saying: "It was purely tribal opportunism
that brought such numbers (50,000) to their side. In other words the
reason why those rebels in the north, organized on a tribal basis, were
fighting for control of the national government was that the NRM as a
government had stopped them from looting."(46)

'The Economist' argues that Museveni has clear interests in there being
no political parties: "were party politics permitted in Uganda and were
they to go 'tribal' - as well they might - Mr Museveni would probably
lose power, since he comes from a small group".(47) It is a matter of
record that Museveni has heavily favoured his own tribe and region in
political, and particularly military appointments. 'The Financial Times'
observed: "Power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of
the president and a group of aides, officials, ministers and army
officers drawn from Mr Museveni's home region in the west."(48) 'New
African' magazine reported that the only officers holding the rank of
Major-General and above in Rwanda are from Museveni's own tribe.(49)

This ethnic imbalance in large part also explains why there is also
armed conflict in western, south-western and eastern Uganda. Western
Uganda is subject to an uprising led by rebels of the Allied Democratic
Forces (ADF).(50) Groups such as the Ugandan People's Redemption Army
and the Uganda People's Defence Forces are also active.(51) An
assessment of unrest in western Uganda published by the London-based
human rights group African Rights stated that there was "an undercurrent
of dissatisfaction" amongst the region's population, who felt vulnerable
and neglected. There was also said to be local political and ethnic
tensions and "a sense of desperation" which created fertile ground for
the insurgency.(52) The report stated that there was a perceived
"democracy deficit within Ugandan politics" and the conditions for armed
rebellion could not be ruled out in the future.(53) Museveni naturally
attributes any unrest in western Sudan to Sudan and the Congo. Seven
thousand Ugandan soldiers were deployed in eastern Uganda because of
ethnic conflict amongst the Karamojong people.(54) There are several
other rebel groups operating in Uganda. These include the West Nile Bank
Front, Uganda Rescue Front II, led by Brigadier Ali Bamuze, the Uganda
Salvation Front/Army, Uganda National Democratic Alliance, the Citizens
Army for Multiparty Politics, as well as FUNA-Uganda National Army.(55)

Rather than accept that it is his divisive ethnicist and repressive
policies that have provoked armed unrest throughout his country,
Museveni has blamed everyone except himself. He has blamed Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda for being behind these
insurgencies. Rwanda, having squabbled with Museveni over the theft of
natural resources in the Congo, has now ritualistically also been
accused of assisting the LRA.(56)

It is Time to Reassess Museveni

Since Yoweri Museveni came to power in 1986, apologists for Museveni
have pointed to Uganda's stability after many years of conflict, high
economic growth rates and the stemming of the upward trend of HIV/AIDS
infection rates in the country. The reality is that his autocratic,
repressive and ethnicist policies have provoked, deepened and escalated
armed unrest throughout Uganda. In addition to the untold suffering he
has caused to the Ugandan people, the United Nations has clearly spelt
out the results of Museveni's policies in the Congo:

"For the more than 20 million people living in the five eastern
provinces, the number of excess deaths directly attributable to Rwandan
and Uganda occupation can be estimated at between 3 million and 3.5

And, whatever he may or may not have achieved in Uganda with regard to
HIV/AIDs, his policies have seen an explosion of HIV/AIDS in the Congo
as a result of the war and suffering he unleashed in that country. The
United Nations, for example, has noted that the Ugandan involvement in
the Congo has resulted in "the spread of HIV/AIDS, the large numbers of
child soldiers and the rape of women".(58)

The Museveni Regime: Undemocratic and Repressive

Museveni's National Resistance Army seized power by military force in
1986. Museveni ruled without any concession to the democratic process
until "no-party" elections were held in 1996, elections in which parties
and party electoral organisation were banned, and in which his National
Resistance Movement was unhindered.

The London newspaper, 'The Observer' has previously noted some of the
democratic short-comings of the Museveni regime: "The Americans are
leading the charge to warn that he is heading towards the kind of one-
party dictatorship the continent knows only too well. At the heart of
the issue is Museveni's ban on multiparty politics." Museveni was
reported to have told Western diplomats that he wishes to maintain a
"no-party state" for at least fifteen years. As the American ambassador,
Michael Southwick, stated shortly before the no-party election: "If you
keep it locked up in a bottle you risk an explosion, because it will
take increasing repression to control".(59) Several years later, a high-
level Western diplomat in Uganda noted that "Museveni has become more
autocratic with time".(60) While the Clinton Administration turned a
blind eye to Museveni's repression - because of his attempts to
destabilise Sudan - the Bush Administration is now questioning human
rights abuses in Uganda.(61)

The African current affairs magazine, 'New African', gave a feel for the
1996 Ugandan election: "The view from Kampala is that (Museveni) cannot
be beaten because he has set the rules and decided the game he will
play. He has manipulated the election process is such a way that it
would be almost impossible for him to lose ... The Minister of State
Security, Col. Kahinda Otafire let fall the extraordinary declaration
that if anyone except Museveni won the presidential elections, he would
be overthrown within 24-hours."(62)

The Ugandan military similarly intimidated opposition politicians during
the 2001 Ugandan elections by stating that they would "veto" the
election of anyone except Museveni.(63) Museveni stated: "Losing is
completely hypothetical. It will not happen."(64) Human Rights Watch
placed on record that the system in Uganda "does not allow free and fair
democratic elections" and that "since the start of the campaign in
January, the opposition have been threatened by violence, arrests, and
intimidation, from soldiers and police."(65) The 'Christian Science
Monitor' noted Museveni's "heavy-handed behavior in the course of the
elections - during which he illegally allowed military officers to
campaign on his behalf, turned a blind eye to the reported intimidation
and harassment carried out against his opposition by the military police
as well as by his supporters, and ignored complaints of election
rigging".(66) Amnesty International has noted: "Since the outcome of the
2001 presidential elections, basic internationally recognised freedoms
of expression, association and movement have become even more strictly
curtailed ... Those with dissenting viewpoints are more likely to become

This sort of behaviour combined with the murderous behaviour of the
Ugandan military can only but breed dissidence and unrest.

A Party to Regional Destabilisation and Genocide

Uganda has since 1997 been involved in the systematic destabilisation of
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the resultant horrific civil
war.(68) This involvement continues to this day.(69) As early as 1992
'The Guardian' reported that: "In the six years since Yoweri Museveni
took power, his government has managed to alienate three of its five
neighbours. Relations remain good with only Tanzania and Zaire."(70)
Museveni sparked off Africa's most tragic humanitarian crisis when it
subsequently sought to destabilise Zaire. In 1997, the London 'Times'
reported that "Uganda ... backed an uprising by rebels in eastern Zaire
who are aiming to drive the Zairean Army from the region and bring down
President Mobutu"(71)

In 2001, Human Rights Watch documented this involvement, stating that
Museveni had "fuelled political and ethnic strife in eastern Congo with
disastrous consequences for the local population."(72) This had included
stirring up ethnic violence, murdering civilians and "laying waste their
villages."(73) Human Rights Watch had also previously noted that Uganda
was responsible for the murder of large numbers of civilians in north-
east Congo.(74) This was also confirmed by Congolese human rights
organisations.(75) In late 2002, Uganda was subsequently again accused
of deliberately seeking to "provoke ethnic conflict, as in the past" -
actions which the United Nations warned risked genocide in the
region.(76) In July 2003, a Human Rights Watch report, '"Covered in
Blood": Ethnically Targeted Violence', stated, for example, that Uganda
was involved in the ethnically-motivated murder of several thousand
Congolese civilians in the Ituri area of north-eastern Uganda.(77)
Uganda continues to arm Congolese gunmen responsible for horrific acts
of terrorism - acts every bit as horrific as those attributed to the LRA
in northern Uganda. The Museveni regime was also accused of militarily
and logistically assisting the UNITA rebel movement in Angola.(78)

Additionally, the UN has repeatedly stated that Uganda was criminally
and systematically stealing Congo's resources.(79) A Human Rights Watch
report also noted that Ugandan forces "have blatantly exploited
Congolese wealth for their own benefit and that of their superiors at

The hypocrisy of Museveni's public bleating about neighbouring states
allegedly destabilising his government is clear.

The International Community's Responsibility for Continuing Conflict in

The international community itself shares a partial responsibility for
the continuing war in northern Uganda. This responsibility is at least
two-fold. Western governments continue to project Uganda as a success
story when the reality is that it is wracked by political turmoil and
Uganda's economy is artificially buoyed by aid. A Refugees International
report has observed, for example, that according to one estimate donors
provide about 53 percent of Uganda's budget. They also cited a UN
official as saying: "[D]onors don't want to portray Uganda as another
African country that is going down the drain. Because they give so much
to Uganda, donors have a political motivation to make sure that it is
seen as a success story."(81) This pretence ignores, in addition to the
conflict in northern Uganda, Museveni's responsibility for the deaths of
millions of civilians in Congo. The international community, by
facilitating a military rather than a peaceful solution, also bears a
direct responsibility for prolonging conflict. A UN news report, for
example, has noted: "Some aid agencies working in the north have
criticised the international community for allowing Museveni's
government to keep the humanitarian crisis in the north on the back
burner ... For example, they have expressed concern over the
government's recent decision to re-allocate 23 percent of funds from
other ministries to defence, seen by some as indicating a preference for
a military solution over a peaceful settlement in the north."(82)

Cecilia Ogwal, the secretary-general of the opposition Uganda People
Congress, has perhaps summed up how many Ugandans feel in her criticism
of the international community for "honouring, praising and financing
the gunman who disturbed the peace and plunged Uganda into a devastating


Museveni's claims about continued Sudanese assistance to the LRA ring
hollow. They attempt to mask the Ugandan government's military
incompetence and political intolerance. Sudan has absolutely nothing to
gain by such a course of action, and - given its impressive diplomatic
gains internationally and regionally - a lot to lose. It may be that
Museveni wishes to damage the Sudanese peace process. It may be that he
simply wishes the war in northern Uganda to go on and on. It may be that
he wishes to continue to justify his army's presence in southern Sudan
to provide them with more time to strip the area of its natural
resources - just as it has done in eastern Congo. It is also clear that
once again Museveni cannot be taken at his word. Despite Sudan having
cut all links with the LRA, the SPLA continues to operate out of Uganda.
Indeed, the SPLA leader is still able to come and go as an honoured
guest within Uganda.(84) The international community must drastically
rethink its approach to the Museveni regime, associated as it so clearly
is with repression, genocide and regional destabilisation. A good
starting point would be to discount Museveni's facile and self-serving
propaganda claims of continuing Sudanese involvement with Ugandan


1 "Uganda: Special Report on the Northern Crisis", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003. Controversy
surrounds these policies. Ugandan religious leaders, for example, have
described the poor conditions into which these civilians have been
forced. Msgr. Mathew Odong, the head of the Lacor Catholic Seminary in
Gulu, has stated: "It is true that nearly half of the population of
people in northern Uganda live in the refugee camps, which are similar
to the concentration camps that used to exist in Germany." See, "Uganda
and Sudan Join Hands to Fight LRA", 'Africanews' (Nairobi), Koinonia
Media Centre, May 2002.
2 Sudan has, for example, over the past several years emerged as a
leader of the region and internationally. These developments culminated
in Sudan's presidency of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) body, as well as the Common Market of East and
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States, as
well as the chairmanship of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference. Sudan's relationship with the
European Union has also improved dramatically: "EU, Sudan to Normalise
Ties, Resume Development After Peace Accord", News Article by Agence
France Presse, 11 December 2002; "EU Seeks to Renew Dialogue with Sudan
Broken Off in 1996", News Article by Agence France Presse, 10 November
1999 and "EU to Resume Financial Aid to Sudan After Decades-Long Break",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 January 2002. In July 2000, the
countries of Africa also selected Sudan to represent the continent as a
non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. The fifty-
three African nations of the Organisation of African Unity chose Sudan
over Mauritius and Uganda to succeed Namibia as the African
representative on the Security Council. Although ultimately unsuccessful
as the result of intense American lobbying, the Egyptian Foreign
Minister said that "there is an African and an Arab decision in Sudan's
favour concerning this issue." Relations with the United States have
also improved. See, for example, "US Allows UN Council to End Sanctions
Against Sudan", News Article by Reuters, 28 September 2001; "US Ready to
End U.N. Sanctions on Sudan Friday", News Article by Reuters, 28
September 2001.
3 See, for example, "Sudan: Uganda Accused of 'Masterminding'
Offensive", UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 7 July
4 'Africa Confidential' (London) 4 October 1996.
5 See "Uganda/Sudan: Joint Statement", signed in Kampala on 13
March 2002, between the Government of Sudan and the Ugandan Foreign
Minister. See, also, for example, "Sudan Lets Uganda Go After Rebels",
News Article by BBC, 15 March 2002; "Ugandan Army Pursues Rebels into
Sudan", News Article by BBC, 4 March 2002; "Ugandan Troops Redeployed
Inside Sudan", News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 March 2002;
"Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader", News
Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002; "Sudanese Govt. Orders
Civilians to Vacate Areas Occupied by Ugandan Rebels", News Article by
Xinhua News Agency, 9 May 2002.
6 "Uganda Constructs Security Roads Inside Sudan", News Article by
Xinhua News Agency, 12 May 2002
7 "Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002.
8 "Sudan Extends Month for Ugandan Army's Operation in Sudan",
News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 24 April 2002.
9 "Sudan Grants Ugandan Army Extension of Stay", News Article by
Agence France Presse, 11 July 2002.
10 "Khartoum Extends Uganda's Right to Pursue Rebels in Sudan",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 November 2002.
11 "Sudan Allows Uganda Troops to Pursue Rebels", News Article by
Reuters, 24 February 2003.
12 See, for example, "Ugandan Rebels Attack Sudanese Govt. Troops",
News Agency by Xinhua News Agency, 21 March 2002; "Ugandan Rebels Attack
Sudan", News Article by BBC, 22 March 2002, "Ugandan Rebels Raid
Sudanese Villages", News Article by BBC, 8 April 2002.
13 "Uganda Claims Success in Sudan Raid", News Article by BBC, 29
March 2002.
14 "Uganda: Army Says Calm Returning to North", UN OCHA Integrated
Regional Information Network, 5 July 2002.
15 "Uganda: Army Says Calm Returning to North." UN OCHA Integrated
Regional Information Network, 5 July 2002. See also, "Army Says Calm
Returning to North", News Article by AllAfrica.com, 5 July 2002
16 "Kony's northern rebels expose the ruling army's faults but
Operation Iron Fist fails to defeat them", 'Africa Confidential'
(London), Vol 43 Number 16, 9 August 2002.
17 See, for example, "Ugandan Army 'Corners Rebels'", News Article
by BBC, 14 April 2002, and "Defense Minister Amama Mbabazi: 'We Have
Cornered Kony'", News Article by AllAfrica.com on 24 July 2002.
18 "Uganda and Sudan Join Hands to Fight LRA", 'Africanews'
(Nairobi), Koinonia Media Centre, May 2002.
19 "Uganda's 16-year Civil War Costs Over 1.3 Billion Dollars",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 6 November 2002.
20 "The War isn't Working", 'Africa Confidential' (London), Vol 43,
Number 16, 9 August 2002.
21 "Soldiers of Tomorrow", 'Africa Confidential' (London), Vol 43,
Number 16, 9 August 2002.
22 "Sudan-Uganda: Khartoum Denies Backing Ugandan Rebels", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 19 June 2003.
23 See, for example, "Sudan to Assist in Fight Against Uganda
Rebels", News Article by Reuters, 10 January 2003. "Ugandan Troops
Redeployed Inside Sudan", News Article by Agence France Presse, 11 March
2002; "Uganda to Launch Offensive into Sudan to Capture LRA Leader",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 17 March 2002.
24 "Uganda: Army denies 'fleeing' from rebels." UN OCHA Integrated
Regional Information Network, 9 July 2002.
25 'New African', November 1996.
26 See, for example, "House Raps Government on Northern War", 'New
Vision' (Kampala), 5 July 2003, "MP Eresu Cautions MPs on Kony", 'New
Vision' (Kampala), 9 July 2003.
27 "Parliament Wants South African Mercenaries to 'Eliminate'
Rebels", News Article by allAfrica.com, 8 July 2003.
28 "Who's Behind the Civil War?", 'The East African' (Nairobi), 23
June 2003.
29 "Sudan-Uganda: African Rights Questions 'Operation Iron Fist'",
UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17 May 2002.
30 "Museveni Says Gov't Needs to Spend More on Defence", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 31 March 2003.
31 "Kampala Beefs Army to 52,000 Strong", News Article by
Allafrica.com, 30 March 2002.
32 "Sh4b Won't End North War, Says Reform Agenda", 'New Vision'
(Kampala), 1 July 2003.
33 "Why Army Has Failed to Uproot Kony Rebellion", 'New Vision'
(Kampala), 2 July 2003.
34 "Gen. Saleh's Shs 4bn Magic Wand Won't Bring Peace", 'The
Monitor' (Kampala), 29 June 2003.
35 "Who's Behind the Civil War?", 'The East African' (Nairobi), 23
June 2003.
36 'The East African' (Nairobi), 23 June 2003
37 "Uganda: Army Denies Blocking Peace Negotiations", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 10 March 2002.
38 "Uganda: Special report on the northern crisis", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003.
39 "Uganda: Little Acholi Gain from anti-LRA Campaign", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 June 2002.
40 Michelle Brown and Sayre Nyce, Uganda's Forgotten Conflict,
Refugees International, 1 November 2002.
41 "Uganda: Civil Society Sets Terms for Peace in the North", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 19 May 2003.
42 "Sudan-Uganda: African Rights Questions 'Operation Iron Fist'",
UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17 May 2002.
43 See, for example, "Kony Calls for Peace Talks", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 30 December 2002.
44 "Museveni Dismisses LRA Ceasefire Announcement", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 March 2003. For LRA ceasefire
offers see, for example, "Ugandan Rebels Offer to Talk Peace, With
International Involvement", News Article by Agence France Presse, 4
February 2003, and "Uganda: Kony Declares Unilateral Ceasefire", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 3 March 2003.
45 David Westbrook, "The Torment of Northern Uganda: A Legacy of
Missed Opportunities", 'The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict
Resolution', Issue 3.2 , June 2000.
46 Yoweri Museveni, 'Sowing the Mustard Seed', Macmillan, London, 1997,
p. 178.
47 'The Economist' (London), 22 July 1995.
48 'The Financial Times' (London), 25 April 1996.
49 'New African', November 1995
50 See, for example, "Uganda: IRIN Special Report on the ADF
Rebellion", UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 8 December
51 See, for example, DRC-Uganda: UPDF Claims 'Foreign Force' Backed
UPC in Bunia", UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 11 March
52 "Rights Group Urges Engagement with Western Areas", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 December 2001.
53 "Rights Group Urges Engagement with Western Areas", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 24 December 2001.
54 "Army 'Armed to the Teeth' to Disarm Warriors", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 23 February 2001.
55 "Uganda", Armed Conflicts Report 2002, Project Ploughshares,
Toronto, 2002.
56 "Uganda: Rwanda Denies Involvement with LRA", UN OCHA Integrated
Regional Information Network, 28 August 2002.
57 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Explotation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York, 16 October
58 Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Explotation
of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York, 16 October
59 'The Observer' (London), 12 May 1996.
60 "Where Despots Once Reigned, a Lazy Afternoon", 'The Christian
Science Monitor' (Boston), 14 March 2001.
61 "America Questions Museveni on Rights", 'The Monitor' (Kampala),
28 June 2003.
62 'New African', April 1996.
63 "Soldiers of Tomorrow", 'Africa Confidential' (London), Vol 43
Number 16, 9 August 2002.
64 "Ungracious Winner", 'Africa Confidential' (London), Vol 42
Number 7, 6 April 2001.
65 "Violence 'Marring' Ugandan Election'", News Article by
Afrol.com, 6 March 2001. See also Human Rights Watch report, 'Uganda:
Not a Level Playing Field', 2001.
66 "Where despots once reigned, a lazy afternoon", 'The Christian
Science Monitor', 14 March 2001.
67 Amnesty International, 14 September 2001.
68 See, for example, "Conflict in Congo Has Killed 4.7m, Charity
Says", 'The Guardian' (London), 8 April 2003, "DR Congo: Africa's Worst
War", News Article by BBC, 8 April 2003 and
69 See, for example, "Uganda 'Arming' Congolese Militia", 'The
Monitor' (Kampala), 8 July 2003, and "Germany Warns Uganda, Rwanda Over
Congo Rebels", 'The Monitor' (Kampala), 10 July 2003.
70 'The Guardian' (London), 23 April 1992.
71 'The Times' (London), 17 January 1997
72 See, Uganda in Eastern DR: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife,
Human Rights Watch, New York, March 2001.
73 "DRC: Ugandan Presence Has Fuelled Strife in Congo", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 27 March 2001.
74 See, "Uganda Blamed for Massacres in North-East Congo Kinshasa",
News Article by Afrol.com, 22 January 2001, and "Clashes in North-
Eastern Congo Uproot Thousands", News Article by Afrol.com, 24 January
75 "Claims of Ugandan Involvement in Ethnic Conflict", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 16 February 2000.
76 "Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda Still Looting the Congo", News Article
by Afrol.com, 22 October 2002.
77 "Report Pins Uganda on Ituri Saga", 'New Vision' (Kampala), 9
July 2003.
78 See, for example, "Uganda: HRW Report Suggests Link Between
Kampala and UNITA", UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 17
December 1999.
79 See Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Explotation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146, United Nations, New York,
16 October 2002. See also "U.N. Details Congo 'Mass Looting'", News
Article by CNN, 16 April 2001, "Congolese Civilians Victims of Foreign
Troops' Exploitation", News Article by afrol.com, 21 April 2001,
"Exploitation of Congolese Resources Continues 'Unabated'", News Article
by Afrol.com, 20 November 2001, "Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda Still Looting
the Congo", News Article by Afrol.com, 22 October 2002.
80 "DRC: Ugandan Presence Has Fuelled Strife in Congo", IRIN, 27
March 2001.
81 Michelle Brown and Sayre Nyce, Uganda's Forgotten Conflict,
Refugees International, 1 November 2002
82 "Uganda: Special report on the northern crisis", UN OCHA
Integrated Regional Information Network, 6 May 2003.
83 'New African', April 1996.
84 See, for example, "Sudanese Rebel Leader Arrives in Uganda",
News Article by Xinhua News Agency, 10 July 2003.