SPLM Response to the Nakuru Draft Framework


1. The SPLM/SPLA recognizes and appreciates the efforts that have been
made by the IGAD Secretariat, Envoys, Observers and the resource
and after intensive consultations with the two parties in capturing
objectively the outstanding issues of the Sudan conflict and in
presenting holistic proposals for their resolution in the Draft

2. The SPLM/SPLA affirms its acceptance of this Framework as the basis
of negations with the GOS on all the issues contained therein namely:
Power Sharing
Wealth Sharing
Security Arrangements
The Three Areas of Abyei, Nuba Mountains and Southern

3. Aware of the tremendous desire and clamor for peace by the Sudanese
people, the SPLM/SPLA came to this Sixth Session of the Political
Committee Task Force fully prepared to discuss and resolve all the
outstanding issues raised in the Draft Framework so as to bring the war
to a final end.

4. It is a fact that the draft Framework neither addresses all the
concerns nor satisfies the perspectives of the SPLM/SPLA on some
important and critical issues of the conflict, but nevertheless we
recognize that the document contains most of the important elements for
a just and lasting peace.

5. Given the time, effort and resources invested by the international
community into this process, the SPLM/SPLA affirms its unwavering
commitment to the IGAD mediation as the only forum that has taken us
much nearer to achieving peace for our country.

6. The SPLM/SPLA will be ready to present its detailed observations on
the Draft Framework if and when the other party signifies its readiness
to discuss the Draft as per the agreed upon agenda of the this Sixth
Session of the Political Committee Task Force. In order to avoid any
loss of momentum in the peace process, we urge the mediators to
reconvene the talks within the shortest time possible on the basis of
the Draft Framework.

CDR. Nhial Deng Nhial
Chief Negotiator SPLM/SPLA

11th July 2003 Serova Lions Lodge, Nakuru-Kenya





GOS Response to the Nakuru Draft Framework


Comments and Remarks of GOS Delegation on Draft Framework for
of Outstanding Issues Arising Out of The Elaborations of The Machakos

Friday, 11 July, 2003

1 General Remakes
1.1 The title of the document points to issues which have cropped up
of the elaboration on the Machakos Protocol, and therefore the Protocol
is the main reference here, so it should be expected that the framework
does not contradict, violate or ignore the major tenets of the
or anything that has properly been based on it, or follows logically
from its spirit. The document clearly does not meet these expectations.
1.2 The outstanding issues are well known, and therefore leaving some
them out, and addressing some of them casually are serious failures,
especially if the one left out is of concern to one side, and the one
treated casually is again of concern to the same side.
1.3 This draft follows the adoption by the IGAD Envoys of what has come
to be known as the totality approach, which is based primarily on the
idea of tradeoffs, that would make signing a peace Agreement possible.
Addressing only one side's concerns goes against that very idea. And
this is what the document does.
1.4 A major theme of the Machakos Protocol is the maintenance of unity
during the interim period, but the draft goes a long distance in the
direction of creating two separate entities with almost no structural
1.5 The draft pre-empted the opportunity to start serious preliminary
negotiations on the all important issues of security and military
arrangements, by offering a "resolution" there, where in fact this
was only touched upon in one unproductive round. This cause a serious
imbalance because of the interconnectedness of all the issues, and in
fact put the totality approach at sever risk.
1.6 In at least one very important phrase the draft recklessly abandons
the language of the Machakos Protocol. It is difficult to accept that
this is an oversight, because the nomenclature has been one of the
debated outstanding issues. (see 10.2)
1.7 1.7 Some parts of the draft give impression of being hastily drawn
up, to the extent that they barely intelligible.(see 1.5 and 2.1)

2 Major departures away from Machakos Protocol
The rejuvenated IGAD peace process has achieved a series of steps the
most significant of which is the signing of the Machakos Protocol,
was hailed by a great many as a breakthrough and has given our own
people hope that peace finally is a realistic possibility. That is why
adhering to this important document should be a mainstay for all the
efforts towards a peaceful settlement. If either side to the
negotiations or the IGAD secretariat, or the observers, show signs of
disrespect to the protocol, then the whole process would collapse.
2.1.1 Machakos Protocol states in its first agreed principles: That the unity of Sudan, based on the free will of the people,
democratic governance, accountability, equity, respect and justice of
all citizens of the Sudan is and shall be the priority of the parties,
and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the People of the
South and to meet their aspirations within such a framework.
2.1.2 The document under consideration pays no attention to this
assertion and proposes a structure of government that does not serve
cause of unity as indicated by the following: It calls for a completely separate army for Southern Sudan. Gives the president and the National Government a limited role
in the South, even where the role is called for by the document itself,
like the appointment of the deputy chairman of the Regional Government
of the South (2.1) It proposes that unless the Chairman of the Regional Government
wishes, the Governors of the states in the North shall be the choice of
the President and the Governors of the States in the South shall be the
choice of the Head of the Regional Government. It leaves the issue of linkages between the levels of
Government, an important outstanding issues, up in the air. Fails to emphasize, or even mention, the decentralization of
South. Suggests the creation of a ministry for Defense in the Regional
Government of the South. While it appropriately calls for national presidential
elections, it leaves the post of the vice president to be filled as a
result of regional elections in which only the voters of the southern
Sudan participate.
2.2 State & Religion
2.2.1 The Machakos Protocol declares with great confidence and relief: Further record that within the above context, the parties have
reached a specific agreement on the Right to Self-Determination for the
people of South Sudan, state and State and Religion etc. And also it states under National Government: Nationally
legislation having effect only in respect of the states outside
Sudan, shall have as it sources of legislation Sharia and the consensus
of the people. See also the mechanism proposed by the Machakos Protocol for
revision of currently enacted legislation in 3.2.4 (i)&(ii).
2.2.2 Yet, despite these clear provisions, the drafter of this
under 3.0 Seat of National Government and National Legislature went on
to prescribe a number of provisions 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, &3.6 that
neither refer to the above stated specific agreement in the Machakos
Protocol, or at least acknowledge its existence and binding nature,
of the enumerated provisions indeed violate the specific agreement or
try to revise it in a manner that would be described as sneaky, and in
light of discussions with the people we believe to be responsible for
the framework and our well known position on the matter, and
by the resource person in the presence the Special Envoy, that the
agreed (and signed) provisions shall not be tampered with, we feel
that the credibility of the whole process is now seriously challenged.
Any draft that in effect brings the binding nature of the Machakos
Protocol in question is not going to enjoy support on our part, and
shall not, we firmly believe, be initiated by the secretariat, or be
encouraged, or endorsed by the friends of the peace process, otherwise
the very foundation of this peace process will crumble, particularly
we know that the other great achievement of the Machakos Protocol:
to Self-Determination can be rendered as ridiculously meaningless, as
State and Religion has been thanks to this unbalanced draft, that can
achieved through tactics similar to the one used in achieving this
present dubious feat, and everybody, who knows anything at all about
the situation in Sudan know that the internal and external detractors
who helped set the stage for this brazen retreat from a signed
commitment, are as negative about self-determination, as they have
to be about state and religion.

3 Percentages and the idea of the inclusiveness
3.1 The attempted resolution by the framework of the issue of the power
sharing fails completely to recognize that the principle of power
sharing shall apply to both to the National government and the RGOSS
the states in Southern Sudan it pays attention only to demands of the
SPLM as regards its (and not the Souths) share in the National
Government, to the complete elimination of any accommodation of the
National Congress Party in the Government the Southern region.
3.2 The post of the Deputy Chairman of the RGOSS should go to the other
signatory to the agreement, using the same logic the framework takes
granted at the national level. The same goes for the posts of Governors
in the Southern region. The framework is silent about any percentages
here as well in the executive branch and state legislatures in the
South. This is a betrayal of the idea of inclusiveness the framework
talks so often about, and continues the trend of failing the cause of
unity as stated above, and on top of that it follows the SPLMS
unwillingness to recognize that many Southerners are members of the
National Congress Party and other parties.
3.3 The so-called adjustment of the number of states in the South is
given to the Regional Assembly of South Sudan as a legislative function
without any attempt at justification, and furthermore the percentage
representing the South in the council of states, is fixed at a certain
percentage in violation of the principle of equal representation of all
states in the Federation (4.5)
3.4 The framework employs an appeasement approach, that ignore the
totality approach when it comes to qualitative representation in the
National cabinet, as it says nothing about the incompatibility of the
constituionlization of a defence ministry for the South with the
up of all cabinet posts at the national level for the SPLM (4.7.1)
3.5 The framework is hopelessly oblivious of the danger that the
obstinate lack of recognition of the non SPLM Southerners could pose to
the sustainability of the peace.

4.1 Elections have been one of the outstanding issues, the framework
neglect to mention them. This could be a benign omission were it not
the fact that the framework pushes the timing of the census (4.3.3) to
the end of the first half of the interim period, which automatically
pushes the election the second half of the inter period. This decision
of the drafter favors one sides early position, without any
4.2 The method by which the constitution of the Southern Region is to
drafted and adopted is one important issue, on which there is no
agreement; the framework that claims to be final cannot turn a blind
to such an issue.
4.3 Tying the president hands is unacceptable, but doing it and at the
same time deferring the mechanism for prompt action for later agreement
makes it more unacceptable and strange.
4.4 The body of the framework in all these segments would be originally
based on the allocation of powers, and it is well known that this area
has been bracketed at the last minute because of the reluctance of the
other side to agree on it. We feel that without agreement on the
allocation of powers the generality of the previsions in this framework
could become a dangerous tool to render the text an amorphous confusion
of possible interpretation.
4.5 The option of having a presidency comprised of a president and one
or more vice president(s), is removed from the framework.

5.1 The agreed principles embodied in Machakos Protocol, particularly
items 1.1, 1.10 and 1.12, which emphasize the need for a concerted
effort to make unity attractive during the interim period, calls for
finding a framework by which all common objectives can best be realized
and expressed for the benefit of all Sudanese people.
5.2 Based on these guiding principles which have further been
in draft (8) of the wealth-sharing protocol an equitable mechanism is
be developed to satisfy the need for all parts of the Sudan for
development, with special consideration for the South and the
war-affected areas. That obviously entails devising an allocation
formula that fulfils the needs of the national Government to carry out
its constitutional and legal responsibilities and allows for the
balanced development of the rest of the country that needs to be
up to the average acceptable standard.
5.3 It was therefore agreed by the end of the last round to convene a
technical group meeting supported by the World Bank and IMF consultants
to agree with the parties to working out the allocation based on an
agreed upon framework, Instead of doing that, we have been presented
with a set of figures which is far removed from what had already
projected, and which in our opinion defeats the principles referred to
5.4 The issue of land and rights was extensively thrashed out in the
last round with the valuable assistance of the Australian expert and it
was decided that a land commission to shall be set up to address land
claims, with consideration to the need for progressive legal review
keeps abreast of modernization requirements, and a means for
compensating lawful claimants. Yet the land issue appeared again in
a way that complicates the problem and takes it out of the context in
which it was dealt with in draft (8).
5.5 The approach to subterranean natural resources as envisaged by the
consultants in the last round was a very positive one. It stressed the
need for focusing on the revenues emanating from subterranean resources
rather than who owns them. On that basis, the suggested framework for
allocation was developed. We now see in the proposed document a
departure from this if read with what is suggested in the land
5.6 To have a unified fiscal and monetary policy, it was technically
agreed that there should be one Central Bank with a branch in the South
with a very clear mandate and boundary. Reference to the bank in the
document as the Bank of Southern Sudan clouds the issue and makes it
look like an independent entity.
5.7 In the membership of the Petroleum Commission it was agreed that
Regional Government in the South will have one representative as the
producing states will have their representatives as well. What appears
in the document is unlimited membership.
5.8 The document states (Persons enjoying rights in land shall be
consulted and their consent shall be sought in respect of decisions to
develop subterranean natural resources) item 13.1.3.The underlined
phrase is an addition which has never been entertained before in the
discussions and it was not part of the statement which was agreed to in
draft (8)
5.9 It is clear in the document that a very stringent measures are
embodied in transparency and accountability requirements of the
Government (item 27.4) as compared to the lenient measures on the
Regional Government (item 27.3)
5.10 The part on Foreign Funding needs to be refined and rephrased. The
conclusion of foreign funding agreement is a national Government
competence as per the devolution of powers agreed to.
5.11 The segment seems to depart frequently from draft (8) that was
concluded and initialled by the two parties, which created some
confusion in the knitting of the different parts. It is necessary to
build on what has already concluded for the sake of the process.
5.12 For the wealth-sharing segment to be successfully concluded it is
imperative that a meeting of the representatives from the two parties
supported by the World Bank and IMF consultants be convened as soon as
possible to finalize the framework agreed upon and what has already

6 Security Arrangements: points for discussion
The two delegations have not got the same opportunity to engage in
preliminary discussions as they have got in the other two areas. The
following are points that we believe represent a middle ground subject
to further negations.
6.1 In the context of a united Sudan, there shall be a single united
National Armed Force (NAF).
6.2 The primary mission of the National Armed Force shall be to defend
and protect the Sudan, its border, its people, its airspace and
territorial waters from external aggression. There shall be no internal
law or order mandate for the National Armed Force (NAF) except in
unusual and constitutionally specified circumstances.
6.3 All armed forces shall be integrated in the National Armed Force
(NAF) before the end of the interim period according to agreed
6.4 The parties agree to a comprehensive cease-fire based on
internationally accepted principles
6.5 Every party shall be responsible for the command and control of
their allied forces.
6.6 For the purpose of this agreement there shall be established a
Command and Control Committee (JCCC) to command and control all forces
in Southern Sudan as of its border of 1956.
6.7 The joint Command and Control Committee (JCCC) shall supervise
implementation of the security and military arrangements specified in
the agreement.
6.8 Internal security shall be the responsibility of Federal and state
police and security organs, which shall all be national, united and
6.9 A Joint Monitoring Board (JMB) shall be established to monitor the
implementation of all agreed security and military arrangements.
International assistance may be sought in this respect.