Professor Peter Blunt[2]



The governance issues addressed in this report are crucial to the
successful establishment in the Southern Sudan of a normally
functioning state. The timing of this report is also important. The
foundations that are laid now will do much to determine the
course, pace and equity of development in the Southern Sudan. The
commissioning of this report by the leadership of the SPLM is
recognition of this fact.

Many people provided essential support to our work in Rumbek. In
particular, we are grateful to Lawrence Tombe of Skills for
Southern Sudan who attended to all of the logistical arrangements with
great courtesy, efficiency, skill, and pleasantness. Agnes
Lasuba, the SPLM representative in London, was a constant source of
moral support, local knowledge and insight, and good
humour. Without her, our work would have been more difficult and much
less enjoyable. We are also thankful to the staff of the
administration centre at Rumbek for the provision of transport and for
everything they did to ensure the smooth running of the

Peter Blunt

Alfred Sebit Lokuji

Catherine Gitau

Anai Mangong Anai

Enok Manyuon Malok

Macksville, NSW, Australia

December 2002

Table of Contents


1. Introduction

1.1 Background Note

1.2 Purpose and Structure of the Report

1.3 Data Sources and Limitations

2. 'Good' Governance

2.1 The Aims of Good Governance: Sustainable Human Development

2.2 Principles of Good Governance

3. SHD in Southern Sudan

3.1 Education

3.2 Health

3.3 Income and Livelihoods

3.4 Physical Infrastructure

3.5 Implications for Development Policy and Strategy

4. Institutions of Governance in Southern Sudan

4.1 Civil Administration

4.2 Legal and Judicial Systems

4.3 Law Enforcement and Prisons

4.4 Financial Institutions

4.5 Economic Management

4.6 Electoral and Parliamentary Systems

4.7 Implications for Development Policy and Strategy

5. Conclusion


6.1 List of Acronyms

6.2 Workshop Participants

6.3 References

6.3 Terms of Reference



Nearly fifty years of continuous civil warfare in the Southern Sudan
has badly eroded social and economic development and
destroyed most of the physical infrastructure, placing it among the
most underdeveloped regions of a continent that contains the ten
poorest countries on earth.

Almost all development activity in the Southern Sudan is undertaken by
civil society, primarily international development assistance
agencies and NGOs and church organisations, and by the communities
themselves. There is little evidence of tax revenues being used for
development purposes.

Until very recently, the energies of the SPLM have been devoted
entirely to waging the liberation struggle, and all available human and
financial resources have been directed to this end. Financial resources in
particular have been, and are, in short supply, and are likely to
so in the short to medium terms. The Southern Sudan will remain heavily
dependent on international development assistance for many years to
come, at least until revenues from major mineral reserves (mainly oil)
can be realised following independence or some other agreed form of

Encouraged by the commencement of the latest rounds of peace
negotiations, which are set to continue in January 2003, attempts
have been made by the SPLM leadership to establish the foundations of a
normally functioning state - a civil administration, legal,
judicial and law enforcement systems, and electoral and parliamentary

It is to be expected that under the extremely difficult conditions that
prevail a number of the central institutions of governance have
yet to be established. Of those that have been established, most do not
function as they should, while others exist in name only.

The establishment of good governance in a peaceful Southern Sudan will
depend greatly on the continuing confidence of the citizenry in its
elected leadership. Public trust and confidence are usually hard won,
easily lost, and - if lost - exceedingly difficult to regain. The
maintenance of public confidence in governance is a function of many
factors. Among the most important of these is the extent to
which citizens perceive that the behaviour of public officials is
determined more by the interests of the community than it is by
self-interest or by (particularistic) allegiances of other kinds, such
as those based on kinship or ethnicity. Public officials must be seen
to be acting impartially in the general public's interests, and to be
held accountable if they do not. Transparency and accountability,
particularly in relation to the management of public funds, are
therefore crucial to good governance because the maintenance of
public confidence and trust in the system of governance depends largely
upon them. Without them, political legitimacy can be
seriously undermined.

The corruption of public officials is clearly more likely, perhaps
inevitable, if they are unpaid - as in the Southern Sudan - or paid

The ways in which public officials are appointed also impinges directly
on public perceptions of government probity. Public
confidence and trust is usually greater if officials are appointed on
the basis of merit At present, these essential elements of good governance do not exist inthe Southern Sudan.

Of most concern are the following:

q The fact that public officials are not paid.

q The absence of financial controls at all levels, and in all
arms, of the civilian administration, the judiciary, the police and

q The absence of merit-based appointment procedures.

q The weaknesses of legislation and written rules and procedures
governing the behaviour of public officials.

q The absence of financial institutions and mechanisms for
macroeconomic management.

These matters should be addressed as a matter of urgency.[3]

The rehabilitation of basic infrastructure is fundamental to all
aspects of development, and constitutes both a necessary and sufficient
condition for the improvement of living standards, health and
It is also clear that it will be necessary to promote
development across a broad front. In particular, development strategies
should include:

q The construction of all weather roads and bridges linking Juba,
and other major towns to its south, and Wau, to Kenya, Uganda,
Zaire and the CAR. The clearing of landmines will clearly have to be
done first.

q The revitalisation of the main Nile waterway linking Juba to
the north, and the reopening to river steamers of the waterway
between Wau and Malakal.

q The revitalisation of the railway running north from Wau.

q The establishment of basic, and accessible, communication

q The development of a power grid, and hydroelectric power

q The eradication of preventable diseases and the establishment
a comprehensive primary health care system

q The establishment of a comprehensive system of primary

q Teacher training for primary, secondary and, in particular,
vocational training.

q The establishment of a network of vocational training
institutes, focusing on basic trades, agriculture, animal husbandry,
and small business.

Electoral and parliamentary systems, which have been dormant for about
ten years, should be subject to functional review.

The next step should be to present these findings and recommendations
to the leadership of the SPLM, which should be done as
soon as possible.

1. Introduction

The liberated areas of Southern Sudan[4] comprise all of that part of
Sudan classified as Southern Sudan during the British colonial
period, plus the Nuba Mountains and the region known as Funz. At
present, Southern Sudan is divided into three administrative
regions: Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal, and Equatoria - see Figure 1.
Sudan as a whole is the largest country in Africa with a total area
of about 2.5 million square kilometres, of which the rebel-held areas
constitute about one half.

Figure 1: Southern Sudan

In the year 2000, UNICEF estimated the total population of the
rebel-controlled areas of the southern part of Sudan to be about 5
million. The inclusion of Nuba Mountains and Funz in the rebel-held
areas will increase this figure significantly. The most populous
region is Bar el Ghazal (more than 56% of the total), followed by
Equatoria (32%), and the Upper Nile. One of the consequences of
the protracted liberation struggle is that there are twice as many
as men in the adult population. Approximately 58% of the
population is below the age of 17. The population is growing rapidly,
with a crude birth rate estimated by UNICEF at almost

1.1 Background Note

For almost half a century, the people of Southern Sudan have been
engaged in a bitter liberation struggle with the Government of
Sudan based in Khartoum. It is a war that has resulted in the deaths of
at least two million Southern Sudanese and the displacement
from their homes of many millions more. There have been horrifying
rights violations on a grand scale. With the exception of
large parts of western Equatoria, where war damage is relatively
and has resulted mainly from sporadic bombings, there has
been widespread destruction of, or serious damage to, physical
infrastructure. The institutional infrastructure of government has been
completely destroyed.

Until recently, it is also a war that has not impinged greatly on the
economic or strategic self-interests of the major world powers and
has therefore failed to attract their serious attention or that of the
international media. Accordingly, it is a war that for the most part
has been conducted in the shadows of history - a war that has resulted
in more death, destruction and suffering than many conflicts
whose causes and casualties for other reasons have been widely
publicised by the world's media.

However, the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities in the
south and the recent spate of terrorist attacks on targets in the
USA and in other countries around the world have aroused international
interest in the conflict in Southern Sudan.[5] At the same
time, in this new international climate, outspoken regional support for
the Government of Sudan has lessened. These developments
are likely to have a significant bearing on the prospects for a peace
agreement arising out of the mediated discussions taking place
between the two sides that are set to resume in Kenya in early 2003.

A critical feature of the discussions that are taking place is the
likely length of the 'interim' or transition period between the date of
final agreement and the attainment by the south of full independence,
some other agreed form of autonomy. It is probable that
the transition will last for about six years. During this period, the
south will have a limited form of autonomy, which may include a
freeze on the commercial exploitation of some or all of its major oil
and gas reserves, which constitute its major potential source of
revenue. If this turns out to be the case, then the south will have to
continue - as it does now - to rely heavily on development
support provided by a wide range of international NGOs, and bilateral
and multilateral development assistance agencies, and on
community self-help initiatives. This reality will severely constrain
governance and development possibilities during the interim period.

1.2 Purpose and Structure of the Report

The purpose of this report is to begin the process of compiling a
comprehensive governance profile[6] for Southern Sudan, that is,
to begin to lay the foundations for the construction of an improved
system of governance in those parts of the Sudan controlled by
the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM).[7] The simple
philosophy underlying this purpose is that any system of
governance[8] should be designed to satisfy, sustainably, the most
pressing human and other development needs of the communities
that it serves and that this should be done in ways that take close
account of local circumstances and resource availability - in
particular, the profiles of human, environmental, financial, and
non-renewable resources that exist in the 'state' to be governed.

Clearly, governance policy should also be based largely on as good an
empirical picture of human and other development needs as can
be obtained at the time with the resources available. The character and
limitations of existing forms of governance are also clearly
crucial to policy calculations. In some cases, the data presented on
these matters in this report have severe limitations, which are
discussed below. Despite these limitations, we have outlined a number
tentative policy implications - particularly for governance
issues demanding urgent attention - arising from our major findings.

In summary, in its attempt to support this heavy burden, this report
sets out for the Southern Sudan a preliminary account of both
sides of the governance equation, that is: first, the condition and
character of the aims of governance as they exist today, and second,
the character and condition of the existing institutional apparatus and
partnerships designed to address these objectives.

The current condition of development in the country is described,
in terms of health, education, and income, which are the
major components of sustainable human development (SHD); and second, in
terms of physical infrastructure. This is followed by a
description of the current condition and character of the major
of governance that exist in the three regions of Southern
Sudan. The latter is rendered in terms of administrative, legal, law
enforcement, financial, economic management, parliamentary and
electoral institutions.[9] Reference is also made to the significant
role of civil society and to the much more limited part currently
played by the private sector. To reiterate, these are the (existing)
ends and means of governance in Southern Sudan, which should
inform the construction of any new system of governance and the nature
and aims of any capacity building associated with it.

Despite the extreme operational difficulties and resource constraints
facing the leadership of the SPLM in the Southern Sudan, it has
begun to take some initial steps towards the establishment of a civil
administration there, which steps are commendable under the
circumstances, and demonstrate the leadership's commitment to the
expeditious re-establishment of a normally functioning state once
peace is restored. Nevertheless, the extent of the devastation of
physical and institutional infrastructure mentioned earlier, and
elaborated below, means that the governance picture presented in this
report is necessarily bleak. In view of the length and ferocity of
the liberation struggle, the extremely difficult nature of the
governance setting, and severe resource limitations, this picture is to
expected. The commissioning of this report, with its constructively
critical purpose, and the workshop that formed its basis, are
further evidence of the SPLM's good governance intentions.

The report concludes with a discussion of the implications for capacity
building of its preliminary findings and makes suggestions for
follow-up work that will be required in order to fill gaps in the
or to strengthen it in other ways. The report also makes
suggestions concerning the discussion of these recommendations by the
strategic apex of the SPLM.

1.3 Data Sources and Limitations

There are few recent economic or social surveys of Southern Sudan, so
valid and comprehensive secondary data are either not
available or in short supply.

The bases of our report are interview data gathered from a workshop
involving more than 90 administrators and community and
NGO representatives from all of the main regions of Southern Sudan. The
workshop, which was conducted over a period of 10
days, was also attended for part of that time by several members of the
senior leadership of the Southern Sudan, including the
Commissioner for Finance, the Commissioner for Law and Order, the Chief
Justice, the Deputy Governor of Bar el Ghazal, and the
Commissioner of Rumbek.

Where we could, we have made use of secondary data - such as UNICEF's
'Progress of Regions' report published in 2000, and its
'Schools Baseline Study'. However, we were unable in the time to
a search of recent literature (mainly agency reports).

The data presented are therefore partly impressionistic and stronger
qualitatively than they are quantitatively.

2. Good Governance

For any system of governance to have any prospect of working well, it
must have its 'feet' planted firmly in the reality of the
circumstances in which it is expected to function.[10] Systems of
governance that are exported wholesale from the west and are
installed in developing countries without due consideration being given
to local conditions invariably fail - sooner rather than later.

While good governance must begin by establishing as a good a fit as is
possible between its character and that of local circumstance
and practice, it is also widely held that it should be guided by a
number of general principles. There is also increasing agreement about
the desired aims of good governance and about the constituent parts or
institutions of good governance. These matters are discussed
briefly below.

2.1 The Aims of Good Governance: Sustainable Human Development

The conventional wisdom of development now gives due emphasis to the
roles of government, civil society, and the private sector as
governance partners who should work together towards the attainment of
social and economic goals, or sustainable human
development (SHD). SHD recognises that there should be more to
development than economic growth and income. Most critically,
it proposes that in order for people to satisfy economic and social
needs and wants they should be healthy and educated, and thereby
empowered. This implies development of the people, meaning the
enhancement of human capabilities and health so that people can
participate fully in life; development for the people, meaning that all
people should have the opportunity to receive or acquire a fair
share of the benefits that flow from economic growth; and development
the people, meaning that all members of society should
have the opportunity to participate in its development. SHD also
proposes that the exploitation of natural environments and
resources should be measured in order to ensure that future generations
are not deprived of development opportunities and benefits
available to people now. This is the idea of sustainability.

2.2 Principles of Good Governance[11]

It is increasingly widely recognised that good governance in any
is characterised by a relatively small number of general
principles, including:

q Political legitimacy that rests on political pluralism, and
periodic free and fair democratic elections - that is, a form of

representation that allows people to have a say in decisions that
their lives.

q Economic and social policies that are equitable and responsive
to people's needs and wants and aim to eradicate poverty and
expand people's choices.

q Protection of people's human rights (e.g., the right to a
reasonable livelihood and gender equality) and fundamental freedoms
(e.g., speech, and association).

q Freedom from all forms of discrimination - thereby allowing
people to live with dignity.

q Clear, established, impartial, and comprehensive legal
frameworks, and law enforcement.

q Bureaucratic transparency and accountability, particularly in
relation to the management of public funds.

q Freely available, valid, and up-to-date information, including
national accounts, cost of living data, employment statistics, and so
on. Freedom of the press, and other media, are clearly crucial here.

q Effective (responsive), efficient, and honest public sector

q Cooperation between government, civil society and the private
sector in the interests of SHD.

These principles are employed in our description and assessment of the
current state of governance in Southern Sudan and in our
recommendations for action.

3. SHD in Southern Sudan

Our intention here is to present an overall picture of SHD in Southern
Sudan, which reveals some of the major needs and constraints,
and illustrates the links (or lack of them) between SHD and the
institutions or apparatus of government, and the roles played by
governance partners.

3.1 Education

There is little education beyond primary school[12] available in
Southern Sudan. For example, in the counties of Yirol and Awerial in
Bahr el Ghazal there are about 27 primary schools but no secondary
schools. In other parts of Bahr el Ghazal, and Equatoria, a few
secondary schools exist, but these are able to supply only a small
percentage of the places needed.

There is considerable variation in terms of access to primary schools
different parts of the three regions. For example, in Pacong
payam there are approximately 36 villages that have no access to
education of any kind. Where access does exist, in many cases
children have to walk long distances to school (up to 20 kilometres).

Education is funded almost entirely by some combination of
NGOs and church organisations and self-help initiatives.

Other significant features of the educational system include:

q A serious shortage of trained teachers at all levels. There are
very few female teachers. Many teachers are volunteers who have
had no relevant training whatsoever.

q Most teachers are remunerated in kind (for example, food and
shelter, and access to land for cultivation) through self-help
initiatives. Some schools have now started to collect fees and to pay
teachers small amounts of cash. Such initiatives vary greatly
between counties and regions.

q Inadequate physical infrastructure - much schooling takes place
under trees; where they exist, school buildings tend to be of mud
brick (or grass mat) and pole frame construction, built by the local

q Serious shortages of books, supplies and equipment. UNICEF is
active in the provision of books and supplies.

q Low attendance rates, especially for girls[13] and children of
pastoralist ethnic groups.

q School curricula vary between regions. Primary schools that are
near to Uganda or Kenya tend to use Ugandan or Kenyan
curricula so that children who are able to can continue in secondary
schools in those countries.

q Parents teachers associations have been set up to manage many
primary schools. Secondary schools tend to be managed by a
board of governors. Fund raising and resource management and school
maintenance are important functions of these entities.

q There are a very small number of vocational education projects
run by church groups and international NGOs.

q Some distance education and teacher training is provided by
IDEAS, and there are a number of NGO and church-funded
teacher training initiatives.

It is evident from the above that responsibility for education in
Southern Sudan is distributed unequally among the three governance
partners identified earlier - the state, the private sector and civil
society. In particular, it is clear that the 'state' and the private
currently contribute little to education in the Southern Sudan. At
present, responsibility for education is assumed almost entirely by
civil society.

3.2 Health

As with education, responsibility for health care in the Southern Sudan
is shouldered almost entirely by civil society.[14] NGOs and
church groups finance all aspects of health care - staff remuneration,
equipment and supplies, medicines, infrastructure and
maintenance, and so on. Again, as for education, geographical coverage
varies greatly between regions. For example, in Yirol and
Awerial (population about 180,000) there is no hospital and no trained
doctor. Rumbek payam in Bahr el Ghazal has no qualified
medical personnel whatsoever.

Other significant health issues include:

q Limited access to clean water and poor sanitation. About 75% of
households do not have access to clean water, and a majority
are unaware of its importance. Almost all households do not use

q High mortality and morbidity rates from a wide range of
preventable diseases - malaria, sleeping sickness, river blindness, TB,
measles, guinea worm, typhoid, and so on.

q High rates of infant and maternal mortality.

q Insufficient numbers of equipped and adequately staffed
hospitals and clinics in all regions. As for education, many health
exist in name only. Many payams have no health facilities.

q Severe shortages of qualified personnel and training

q Severe shortages of medicines and supplies.

q Low levels of health awareness and education, and persisting
strong beliefs in traditional medicine men and women. For
example, apart from eastern Equatoria, a majority of adults have never
heard of HIV or AIDS (more than 75% in Bahr el Ghazal
and Upper Nile).

q High cost of treatment for certain diseases.

The snapshots of health and education provided above suggest that human
development in Southern Sudan is similar to, and possibly
worse than, other post-crisis states such as East Timor.

3.3 Income and Livelihoods

For most people, income and livelihoods are based on subsistence
agricultural and pastoral and fishing activities. In general terms,
pastoralism dominates in Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and in eastern
Equatoria, while agriculture dominates in central and western
Equatoria. Fishing is widespread along the Nile and its tributaries and
in the 'lakes' region.

In agricultural areas, cash crops include coffee, tea, cotton, palm
sesame seed, tobacco, and a wide range of fruits, vegetables and
grains. Although depleted by war and disease, cattle herds are large,
and cattle trading, mainly into Uganda, is a significant economic

The poor condition of roads and infrastructure severely limits
commercial trading and retail activity. The extremely poor state of
infrastructure in general also severely restricts opportunities for the
exploitation of natural resources such as timber, gold, iron ore,
and the establishment of down-stream manufacturing and/or value-adding,
particularly for timber, oil products, food (vegetables
and fruit), meat (mainly beef), sugar, medicinal plants and herbs, and
fish processing. Infrastructure-dependent opportunities also exit
for a wide variety of tourism activities[15], big game hunting and
fishing, all retail sectors, and road and river transport. Significant
opportunities exist for the generation of hydro-electricity.

Apart from infrastructure and transport, other limits to the
of economic activity and livelihoods include:

q The legal environment of business, including problems
surrounding property rights, particularly in relation to rights to
subterranean mineral deposits[16], water and pasture; and contracts.

q The unreliability and partiality of the judicial system and law
enforcement (see below).

q Limited access to, and availability of, credit and low levels
domestic investment.

q The underdeveloped nature, and relatively small size, of the
domestic market.

q Lack of experience and skills in business and

q Tsetse fly.

q Cattle rustling and banditry in the north and in eastern

q Generally low levels of education and health.

3.4 Physical Infrastructure

All of the major components of the physical infrastructure of Southern
Sudan are either completely destroyed or in a serious state of

q Roads, railways, and waterways: South of Juba, there is a
network of (what were all-weather) roads connecting Equatoria
with Kenya, Uganda, Zaire and the Central African Republic. North of
Juba, the Nile, which is navigable to Khartoum and beyond,
is the major arterial connection. The waterway from Wau to Malakal is
choked with water hyacinth and not navigable by steamer.
There is a railway running north from Wau to Kosti. Most roads are
impassable during the rainy season. Many bridges have collapsed
or are in a bad state of repair.

q Power stations: there are no operable power stations in the
rebel-held areas of Southern Sudan. There are defunct
hydroelectricity plants at Damazin and Nimule.

q Communication: this is entirely by relatively high cost radio
satellite telephone. There is no postal service.

q Buildings: most government buildings have either been destroyed
or are in a bad state of repair. Likewise, there has been
widespread destruction of commercial buildings and private dwellings
through out the Southern Sudan.

q Reticulated water supply: few urban areas have reticulated

q Other: land mines are a serious problem, and will impede the
rehabilitation of road networks.

The bad condition of the infrastructure is clearly a serious impediment
to the development of domestic economic activity and
investment, and to FDI.

3.5 Implications for Development Policy and Strategy

The outline presented above of the condition of SHD and physical
infrastructure in the Southern Sudan illustrates something of the
magnitude of development needs and the severity of development
Much more detailed study than has been possible here
is clearly necessary to inform policymaking and development strategy.
During the interim period, the Southern Sudan will also be
heavily dependent on development assistance and therefore the
development interests (policies) of donors.

However, it is clear from the above that the rehabilitation of basic
infrastructure is fundamental, and constitutes both a necessary and
sufficient condition for the improvement of living standards, health
education. It is also clear that it will be necessary to promote
development across a broad front. In particular, development strategies
should include:

q The construction of all weather roads and bridges linking Juba,
and other major towns to its south, and Wau, to Kenya, Uganda,
Zaire and the CAR. The clearing of landmines will clearly have to be
done first.

q The revitalisation of the main Nile waterway linking Juba to
north, and the reopening to river steamers of the waterway
between Wau and Malakal.

q The revitalisation of the railway running north from Wau.

q The establishment of basic, and accessible, communication

q The development of a power grid, and hydroelectric power

q The eradication of preventable diseases and the establishment
a comprehensive primary health care system

q The establishment of a comprehensive system of primary

q Teacher training for primary, secondary and, in particular,
vocational training.

q The establishment of a network of vocational training
institutes, focusing on basic trades, agriculture, animal husbandry,

4. Institutions of Governance in Southern Sudan

It is clear from our discussion to this point that governance
circumstances - in terms of SHD and physical infrastructure - in the
Southern Sudan are among the most difficult imaginable. Until very
recently, the rebel-held areas were subject solely to the military
rule of the freedom fighting army. However, in the last few years, as
prospects for a lasting peace have started to emerge, the SPLM
leadership has begun to construct the framework of a civil
administration, and legal, judicial and law enforcement systems outside
the army. This section of our report provides a very brief account of
the stage of development and character of what has been done
to date in these respects.

4.1 Civil Administration

Our discussion of civil administration focuses on four crucial aspects:
appointment and deployment procedures; revenue collection
and financial control; formalisation of rules and procedures; and
certain aspects of organisational structure.

The formal structure of the civil administration is outlined in the
vision statement of the SPLM published in the year 2000. Beneath
the national level, there are four administrative strata: regional,
county, payam and boma.

Important keys to understanding the operation of the system are the

q Civil administrators are not paid but are authorised to collect
a wide variety of taxes. These taxes include: a liberation tax; a

services tax; personal income tax; customs and excise duty; vehicle
registration; airstrip landing permits; road tolls; business and retail
licenses; market fees; regional taxes; cattle auction tax; cattle
trading tax; fishing and game hunting licences; cattle sales tax; and
in kind levied for the army (food and cattle). Notional percentages of
each tax are allocated to different types of expenditure and for
remittance to the centre. There is wide variability between counties
regions with respect to tax collection.

q There are no systems of financial management or control at any
level. No accounts are kept of income from the collection of
taxes, or of expenditure. There is therefore little or no budgeting.
There are no systems of financial or performance audit. There is no
financial transparency or accountability.

q There are no 'national' accounts kept.

q Civil administrators are not appointed on merit at any level.
The vast majority of senior administrators are ex-army officers
appointed by the SPLM leadership. There are no open merit-based
recruitment and selection procedures. Administrative capacity and
capability among existing civil administrators is therefore extremely
limited. Skilled and experienced administrators exist outside of the
system, but are not utilised because of the appointment procedures

q There is little or no formalisation of rules and procedures of
any kind.

q The management of the civil administration is therefore highly
personalised, and extremely hierarchical and militaristic.

An unsurprising, and well-founded, consequence of all of this is that
ordinary people feel that the primary purpose of the civil
administration is to provide opportunities for the personal enrichment
of its senior officers and their sponsors. The absence of
financial controls and evidence of 'publicly funded' development
activity make it difficult to prove otherwise. The political dangers,
and development costs, of allowing such a system to persist are clear.

4.2 Legal and Judicial Systems

The legal system incorporates at its foundations important elements of
traditional or customary law and practice, along with
common law and statutory law. Parliament has not sat since late 1999,
there is a significant backlog of legislation awaiting
enactment. There are therefore significant gaps in the legal system.

The judicial system comprises six tiers: executive chief, boma, payam
and county courts, high court, and court of appeal.

There are severe shortages of trained legal personnel at all levels.

Many of the problems that attend the civil administration are also
evident in the judicial system. In particular:

q There is no system of financial control governing the
of funds derived from fines and court fees. That is, there is no
financial transparency or accountability.

q The appointment of judges is perceived not to be based on

q Judges are perceived to be open to influence.

q The judicial system is perceived to prefer civil disputes to
criminal cases because of the better opportunities for (personal)

generation associated with the former.

q The judicial system is therefore perceived to be partial and

In addition:

q The hierarchy of courts makes little allowance for variations
in traditional and customary laws, and appears to contradict the
SPLM's stated preferences for a 'bottom-up' system of governance.

q The high court's involvement in the management and organisation
of lower courts seems misplaced.

As for the civil administration, the political dangers, and development
costs, of allowing such a system (and perceptions of it) to
persist are clear.

4.3 Law Enforcement and Prisons

As with the civil administration, the vast majority of police and
personnel comprise ex-army NCOs and enlisted men. Many
of these men were demobilised and transferred to the police and prisons
because they were approaching retirement age or were
disabled physically. Very few of them have had any experience of police
or prison work or any training for it. Most police officers
formerly held the rank of NCO in the army.[18]

Neither the police force nor prisons is funded centrally. Personnel are
not paid. There is no official central funding made available for
equipment, supplies, transport, or infrastructure (buildings). Like the
civil service, the police force is therefore 'self-financing'. Various
forms of public harassment are used to generate income - from
roadblocks for vehicle 'fines' to false arrest.

As with other governance institutions, there is no financial
transparency or accountability.

There is no funding to feed or house prisoners or to care for their
health needs. Families must provide for prisoners' needs or they
are not provided for at all. The prison service has fewer opportunities
for 'self-financing', and is therefore less sought after as a
transfer or deployment destination.

One of the police force's primary roles is to provide 'protection' to
civil tax collectors and the judiciary, and to assist with the
enforcement of court rulings - particularly where the collection of
court fines and fees are concerned.

Other issues of law enforcement include:

q The wide distribution of small arms among the community.

q The almost half century of war, and semi-anarchy, which is said
to have made the population at large less law-abiding.

4.4 Financial Institutions

As might be expected, none of the essential components of the financial
institutions of governance exists. A Commission of Finance,
headed by a Commissioner, has been established but the means are not
in place for it to do its work. There is no central
payments authority or central bank, and no commercial banks or other
commercial financial institutions. As we have seen from earlier
sections of this report, there are no effective financial control
mechanisms in place within government (such as financial reporting and
financial audit).

Economic transactions are conducted in a variety of currencies - mainly
Kenyan and Ugandan shillings, US dollars and Sudanese

4.5 Economic Management

None of the components of the institutional apparatus necessary for the
exercise of macroeconomic management currently exist at all
or, if they do exist, do so in a less than satisfactory form. For
example, the absence of financial controls makes impossible the
exercise of effective fiscal management, control of imports and
and so on.

4.6 Electoral and Parliamentary Systems

The first and only election held in Southern Sudan was conducted in
1994. Parliament has 204 members elected from the
membership of lower-level elected bodies (liberation councils)
comprising the SPLM national congress. Liberation councils at each
level are elected by SPLM congresses. As indicated earlier, parliament
has not met since late 1999, largely, it is said, because of the
significant costs involved. Regional congresses are still in the
process of being established.

At present, the electoral system does not allow for competing political
parties. Neither is it clear what the life of parliament is, nor the
tenure of members of parliament. A defined constituency of voters does
not elect members of liberation councils.

Other issues include:

q The role of chiefs and - in some regions - the proliferation of
chieftainships because of the administrative and judicial powers
associated with them.

q The eligibility of women voters and their participation in the
electoral system.

The SPLM's vision statement contains a reasonably detailed account of
the proposed structure and roles of elected bodies at the
boma, payam, county and regional levels. This structure has not been

4.7 Implications for Development Policy and Strategy

The most striking, and politically dangerous, aspects of the nascent
institutions of governance in the Southern Sudan are the absence
of transparency and accountability, particularly in relation to
finance,and the absence of merit-based appointment procedures. These
characteristics of the systems in place seriously undermine public
confidence in the institutions of governance. Unless these matters are
confronted openly and rectified quickly, development will be retarded
and public cynicism about governance will become ingrained.

Among other things, addressing these issues will entail:

q The development and implementation of merit-based appointment
procedures. Incumbents should be required to apply for
their positions, which should be advertised, or should allow for some
form of what is perceived by the public to be relatively open
and merit-based competition.

q The calculation of salary scales, and the payment of salaries
to all civil servants (including teachers, health and agricultural
workers),legal and law enforcement personnel. This will be a major undertaking,
which will clearly be dependent on resource availability.

q The establishment of transparent systems of financial control
for all levels of the civil administration, the judiciary and courts,
and police and prisons. These will include management accounting systems
and systems of financial and performance audit.

q Capacity building, particularly on financial management and
development planning for senior administrators.

The major elements of the financial institutions of governance clearly
need to be established as a matter of urgency, as do mechanisms
for macroeconomic management. This will require separate detailed

The electoral and parliamentary systems, which have been dormant for
about ten years, should be subject to detailed functional

5. Conclusion

This report provides rationale and direction to governance reform and
capacity building for good governance in the rebel-held areas
of Southern Sudan.

The most urgent and important issues of governance raised concern the
lack of transparency and accountability at all levels, and in all
arms, of the newly established civil administration. If allowed to
persist, this situation will undermine people's confidence and trust in
the system of governance, which confidence will be difficult to regain.

We therefore recommend that these matters be addressed as a matter of

We also stress the fundamental - and clear - importance to all aspects
of sustainable development of the rehabilitation of basic
physical infrastructure. Attention also needs to be given to primary
and vocational and secondary education and primary health care.

The resources and time required to address this limited range of
development issues will be considerable - and much explanation will
be required to a public whose expectations of what autonomy can
and how quickly, are invariably disappointed by the slow
pace of progress.

These matters should be brought to the attention of the leadership of
the SPLM as soon as possible.


6.1 List of Acronyms

CAR Central African Republic

FDI Foreign direct investment

IDEAS Institute of Development, Environment, and
Agricultural Studies

NCO Non-commissioned officer

NGO Non-governmental organisation

SHD Sustainable human development

SPLM Sudanese peoples liberation movement

TB Tuberculosis

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

6.2 Workshop Participants

6.3 References

SPLM, (2000). Peace through Development: Perspectives and Prospects in
the Sudan. Nairobi: SPLM.

UNICEF, (2000). Progress of Regions: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
Results, 2000. Nairobi: UNICEF.

Fukuda-Parr, S., & Ponzio, R. (2002). 'Governance: Past, Present and
Future. In Background papers for 4th Global Forum on
Reinventing Government. New York: UN DESA, pp. 108-129.

Blunt, P. (2002). 'Public Administration Reform and Management
Innovation for Developing Countries'. In Background papers for
4th Global Forum on Reinventing Government. New York: UN DESA, pp.

UNDP, (1997). Reconceptualising Governance. New York: Department of
Public Affairs, UNDP, pp. 93 & xi.

UNDP, (1995). Public Sector Management, Governance and Sustainable
Human Development. New York: Department
of Public Affairs, UNDP, pp. 130 & xxvi.

6.3 Terms of Reference

[1] This work was commissioned by 'Skills for Southern Sudan' with
funding support from DFID.

[2] Professor Alfred Sebit Lukadji provided a number of helpful notes
and comments, and assisted with data collection. Catherine Gitau, Anai
Mangong Anai, and Enok Manyuon Malok assisted with data collection.

[3] Feedback obtained from participants about what they would most like
to see happen next ranked such actions highly.

[4] The towns of Malakal, Wau, Bentiu, Bor, Mongalla, Juba, and Torit
are still held by the Government of Sudan. All of these towns are
surrounded by rebel-held territory.

[5] Concerns about the Nile have meant that Egypt has always been
interested in the course of the conflict and opposed to secession. Arab
solidarity in the region has also played a part.

[6] Our use of the term 'governance profile' is broader than might be
considered usual in that it includes what should be the (sustainable)
development aims of government and other governance partners. However,
our emphasis is on the government apparatus, particularly civil

[7] The only other document that we could find that has attempted to
construct an overview of development in the south is 'Peace Through
Development: Perspectives and Prospects in the Sudan', published by the
SPLM in 2000. Our report up-dates information presented in the earlier
report and expands the areas covered, particularly in relation to the
condition of SHD, and the character of the evolving system of
administration, and
other institutions of governance.

[8] Our view of governance is the conventional one (see, for example,
UNDP, 1995, 1997) - among other things, that it comprises a partnership
between government per se, civil society and the private sector. The
strength of this partnership and the influence of each partner clearly
vary greatly
between national governance settings. Accordingly, in this view, the
attainment of SHD is a joint responsibility.

[9] This is largely unexplored terrain in the Southern Sudan. Indeed,
we know of no published accounts of administrations established by
rebel movements anywhere.

[10] The same can be said for management and civil service systems
(e.g., see Blunt, 2002).

[11] Recent discussion of the notion of 'good' governance has suggested
terms such as 'humane' and 'democratic' governance (e.g., Fukuda-Parr &
Ponzio, 2002). In this discussion, we use the term 'good' governance,
but incorporate some of the latest thinking on 'humane'
and 'democratic' governance.

[12] There are estimated to be about 2,000 primary schools in the
liberated areas. Many of these primary schools are only able to provide
education to
standard four, or in some cases less. Some schools exist in name only
because they have no teachers.

[13] Overall attendance rates are estimated to be about 37% for
children between the ages of 6-17 years. School attendance rates among
girls in the Nuba Mountains are much higher than in other regions - up
to 50%. There are also many more female teachers in this region.
Largely cultural reasons are adduced to explain this.

[14] A small number of private health clinics have been established,
and many areas have private pharmacies.

[15] For example, the Sudd swamps may have the largest concentration of
birds in the world.

[16] Here possibilities should be considered for allowing landowners to
charge access fees to companies that have valid claims to minerals that
lie beneath their land.

[17] In the past, Arabs from the north controlled most retail and
trading activity.

[18] It was clear from our discussions that service in the police force
or prisons was considered to be much less desirable than service in the
civil administration, no doubt because of the more limited
opportunities for income generation available there.


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