BAHR EL GHAZAL IN KENYA(17th June, 2003)
We, the undersigned citizens of Bahr El Ghazal Region of South Sudan resident in Kenya, joined by a number of our compatriots from elsewhere in the Diaspora, who are currently visiting Kenya, attended a meeting convened by Bahr El Ghazal Consultative And Coordinating Committee (C.C.C), in Nairobi on Tuesday 17th June 2003. The meeting conferred on the state of South Sudan politics and liberation struggle. READ MORE.........
KAMPALA -- An American think tank has said that Uganda and Senegal
are surprise stopovers for US President George W. Bush, who visits
Africa next week.
The think tank, Strategic Forecasting, says in a report issued this
week that the US President will be hoping to tap into the
predominantly Muslim Senegal and one of France's traditional allies in
West Africa.
"As for Uganda, Kampala's co-operation is key to the conflict in
Sudan," the group says in an analysis issued this week.
"Washington is working with Khartoum, but still wants to keep
pressure on the Arab government in the north by indirectly supporting
the southern rebels," it says.
Washington has since 2001 made an effort to woo Sudan for what
analysts said was because of its strategic location to the Middle East
and its oil potential.
President Bush has resumed low key diplomatic relations with
Khartoum.
"The White House might see reviving its relationship with Uganda as
an important step to reshaping regional issues, such as the Sudanese
civil war, in the future," it says.
The White House last week confirmed President Bush's visit that will
take him through Senegal, Nigeria, Uganda, Botswana and South Africa.
"The decision to visit Kampala, however, is odd in one respect," the
report says.
The group notes that "in 2001, following Ugandan President Yoweri
Museveni's re-election, rumours surfaced that the United States helped
to get rival presidential candidate Kizza Besigye out of the country."
It says that this was meant to prevent his arrest by Uganda
authorities.
But it adds: "Museveni has faced growing opposition in the past year
and has become more troublesome as a political partner for the United
States because of his role in the civil war in the Congo."
It notes that the United States has kept a distance from that
conflict.
But it notes that the "region still is a rich source of natural
minerals and strategic for conflicts in the Central African Republic,
Chad, Sudan and southern Africa".
President Bush is expected to stay three days in South Africa in
what the group thinks is an intensification of intelligence gathering
co-operation in the war on terrorism.
Says the group: "During his visit, Bush likely will call on both
Abuja and Pretoria to increase intelligence sharing."
NAIROBI, June 26, 2003 (IRIN) -- A peace deal in war-torn Sudan will
not be sustainable if the grievances driving conflict in the
marginalised areas of Darfur, Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba
mountains are not fully addressed, the Brussels-based think-tank
International Crisis Group (ICG) has said.
The current peace talks between the government and the rebel Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) were not adequately
addressing all of the country's armed conflicts, the ICG said in a new
report entitled 'Sudan's Other Wars'.
"The clear danger is that as long as these groups continue to feel
marginalised and their views are not represented in the IGAD process,
the pull toward violence will remain compelling."
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) is steering
the talks which led to the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July
2002.
The grievances of the populations in these regions had long been
viewed as matters of "secondary importance", said the ICG. "There is
real potential for those who feel ignored by the IGAD peace process to
undermine any deal that is between only the Khartoum goverment and the
rebel SPLA."
The root causes of the conflict in the contested areas of Abyei,
Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba mountains - religion, race, resource
distribution, and political marginalisation - were a microcosm of the
broader Sudanese conflict, the report stated.
"The negotiations on the three areas provide an opportunity to
create an important peace template by dealing with the core issues of
how the country has been governed from the centre."
Negotiations on the three areas took place under the chairmanship of
the Kenyan government in March 2003.
The violence in Darfur, which erupted in February 2003, should be
the subject of a separate and concentrated initiative - by the
government and strongly encouraged by the international community - in
order to ensure an end to hostilities, the report added.
The next session of IGAD peace talks between the government and the
SPLM/A is due to start in Kenya on 6 July.
On May 8, Attorney General John Ashcroft filed an amicus
uriae ("friend of the court") brief for the defense in a
civil case alleging that the oil company Unocal was complicit
in forced labor and other abuses committed by the Burmese
military during the construction of the Yadana gas pipeline.
The case, John Doe I, et al. v. Unocal Corporation, et al.,
was originally filed in 1996 and is currently being reheard
by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Justice Department brief went well beyond the scope of
the Unocal case, however, and argued for a radical re-
interpretation of the 1789 Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA). For
over 20 years, courts have held that the ATCA permits victims
of serious violations of international law abroad to seek
civil damages in U.S. courts against their alleged abusers
who are found in the United States. The Justice Department
would deny victims the right to sue under the ATCA for abuses
committed abroad.
"This is a craven attempt to protect human rights
abusersdictators and abusive companies at the expense of
victims," s," [nb I think it's bad advocacy to be lumping
together dictators and companies (suggests the law really is
misguided).] said Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human
Rights Watch. "The Bush administration is trying to overturn
a longstanding judicial precedent that has been very
important in the protection of human rights."
Courts have upheld human rights suits under the ATCA since
1980, in a case brought by the father and sister of Joel
Filartiga, a seventeen-year-old Paraguayan. Filartiga was
kidnapped and tortured to death by a Paraguayan police
official who subsequently emigrated to the United States. In
that case, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
ATCA permitted victims to pursue claims based on serious
violations of international human rights law. Victims have
also been awarded damages against other perpetrators,
including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadic and former
Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos. However, because the
defendants have traditionally been non-residents without
assets in the U.S., it has been difficult to collect the
awards.
The Justice Department argued that the ATCA could not be used
as a basis to file civil cases and that victims should sue
under other laws; that the "law of nations" covered by the
ATCA did not include international human rights treaties; and
that abuses committed outside of the United States would not
be covered under the law. No previous administration has
challenged the legitimacy of ATCA cases against gross human
rights abusers.
If the Administration's argument were upheld, some of the
cases that would not have gone forward include:
*The 1996-97 Holocaust Litigation cases against Swiss
banks, which led to a U.S. government-negotiated settlement
to pay Holocaust survivors approximately $1.25 billion. The
cases were brought under several laws, including the ATCA.
*Presbyterian Church of Sudan, et al. v. Talisman Energy
Inc., a 2001 suit filed in New York federal district court
alleging that Talisman Energy was complicit in human rights
abuses committed by the government of Sudan in oil-producing
areas where Talisman operated. The court denied the
company's motion to dismiss the case on March 19, 2003.
*Raymonde Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer
Francais, a case filed in 2000 in which Holocaust survivors
alleged that the National French Railroad Company deported
Jews and others to Nazi death camps. A New York district
court dismissed the case on November 7, 2001; it is currently
on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.
"The Justice Department brief could do a lot of damage to
this important legal precedent,"shows astonishing disregard
for those who have suffered under abusive regimes [nb or some
wording, but this is boring and vague, and suggests that we
think it could sway the court, and we don't want to concede
that]," said Roth. "Supporters of humanvictims rights [nb
let's bring in the right wingers!] need to speak up in
support of the Alien Tort Claims Act andshould tell the Bush
aAdministration to leave itthe Alien Tort Claims Act alone."
The Alien Tort Claims Act was adopted as part of the original
Judiciary Act in 1789 and states that "[t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort [personal injury] only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."
In 1993, lawsuits were brought against multinational
companies for alleged complicity in human rights violations
abroad. There have been at least twenty-five such cases
against companies over the last ten years; the courts have
dismissed most of these cases and have not rendered any
judgments against companies.
The Doe v. Unocal case was originally filed in 1996. In
1997, a U.S. federal district court in California ruled that
the company could be held liable for the alleged abuses, but
subsequently dismissed the case in 2000. Two years later,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the ruling and
allowed the case to proceed. However in February 2003, the
Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc. The Justice
Department brief was filed for this rehearing.
Human Rights Watch is not a party to any lawsuit filed under
the ATCA, nor does it take a position on the merits of any
particular case. However, Human Rights Watch believes that
victims should have the option to file such suits.
Eric Reeves
June 3, 2003
For the second time in the last few months, there is an extremely
disturbing report of civilian atrocities in Eastern Upper Nile (southern
Sudan), conducted by military forces directly allied with Khartoum's
National Islamic Front. Like the previous report on the evident
civilian massacre at the villages of Liang, Dengaji, Kawaji, and Yawaji
in Eastern Upper Nile, the present report provides a precise date and
location, as well as an abundance of very particular details about the
nature of the attack and its victims. This demands that investigators
determine clearly whether there had indeed been yet another egregious
violation of the various agreements Khartoum has made not to attack
civilians. These include:
[1] "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement to Protect Non-combatant Civilians
and Civilian Facilities from Military Attack" (March 2002). The
agreement was brokered by US special envoy for Sudan John Danforth; this
created the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) that has
chronicled in great detail the many intensely destructive attacks on
civilians and humanitarian relief in the oil regions of Western Upper
Nile during January and February 2003;
[2] "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the Sudan
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) on Resumption
of Negotiations on Peace in Sudan" (October 15, 2002). The agreement
specifies that the parties will "refrain from any acts of violence or
other abuse on the civilian population."
[3] "Addendum to the Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of
Hostilities Between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement/Army" (February 4, 2003). The "Addendum" reaffirms
the October 15, 2002 agreement and commits Khartoum "to avoid further
violations of the [October 15, 2002] MOU," including, of course, attacks
on civilians.
[4] These agreements are in addition to those embodied in the Geneva
conventions bearing on military conduct against civilians (at least
those to which Khartoum is party).
But none of these agreements seems to have mattered in Nuer villages
near Longochok in Eastern Upper Nile (Longochok is approximately 65
kilometers northeast of Nasir). According to a press release of today
from Servant's Heart, a humanitarian NGO operating in the area, on May
22, 2003 (11pm local time):
"Government of Sudan-led military forces attacked the village of
Longochok and nine nearby villages in a night assault that caught most
villagers asleep in their grass homes. The Government-lead forces
attacked using a combination of rocket-propelled-grenade launchers
(RPG's), .50 caliber heavy machine guns and assault rifles. Many of
the homes in the ten villages were set on fire by the attackers, and
many of those killed were burned alive in their homes as they hid from
the Government-led forces.
"Government of Sudan regular army officer Second Lieutenant Mohammed
Idris led the attack on behalf of the Government of Sudan.
"During the attack, the Government of Sudan-led military forces rounded
up and abducted ten children and six woman. The names of the kidnapped
villagers are attached. The list of the 59 villagers killed by the
Government-led soldiers is being collected, and will be published once
it is available. Photographs of the atrocity site will also be made
available once weather and travel challenges are overcome."
This is specific, credible, and highly detailed information (even the
list of those abducted was patiently spelled out over satellite phone;
it appears in the full press release, attached below). The attacks on
ten locations appear to have been simultaneous and thus quite well
planned. There was no opposition SPLA military presence in the
villages. In this respect, the present report from Servant's Heart is
very similar to their report on the April 2002 atrocities at Liang,
Dengaji, Kawaji, and Yawaji (also in Eastern Upper Nile), reported by
the organization to a senior member of the State Department's task force
on Sudan in February 2003. No investigation was ever made of what
happened at these sites. A reported massacre of as many as 3000
civilians, nowhere near any fighting, has never been confirmed or
disconfirmed.
This is the context in which we must assess both Khartoum's decision to
launch this reported new attack, and the appalling likelihood that the
reported attack will again remain uninvestigated. The US-led Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) has already been deeply compromised by
recent changes in personnel and procedures (see May 30, 2003 analysis
from this source; available upon request). Its all too likely failure
to investigate this present event will reveal just how fully corrupt the
mission of the CPMT has become. Indeed, if the events at Liang,
Dengaji, Kawaji, and Yawaji are as reported by Servant's Heart, then
there is a clear causal relation between the failure to investigate that
attack and Khartoum's calculation that this new attack would also go
uninvestigated.
Certainly Servant's Heart (which has worked in this part of Sudan for a
number of years) has twice now provided much more than what must count
as prima facie evidence of a massive military assault on civilians,
clearly constituting a violation of the agreement that CPMT was created
to enforce through its investigations. Indeed, the list of abductees is
painfully specific in its detailing of name, age, and sex:
Nyanop Liech Tiek---girl, 8 years old
Nyaluak Liech Tiek---girl, 6 years old
Nyabuay Liech Tiek---girl, 5 years old
Nyanpal Liech Tiek---girl, 2 years old
Ruon Gadet Manyal---boy, 6 years old
Reath Gadet Manyal---boy, 4 years old
Nyanot Lul Nyuot---girl, 8 years old
Nyanpal Lul Nyuot---girl, 5 years old
Nyabiel Lul Nyuot---girl, 2 years old
Duoth Chuol Kuon---boy, 4 years old
Nyadeng Dew Yak---woman, 35 years old
Nyator Gay Buok---woman, 31 years old
Nyanhial Gadet Bor---woman, 30 years old
Nyaduar Deang Jany---woman, 38 years old
Nyaboth Thokier Nguoy---woman, 29 years old
Nyamuol Chuol Nhial---woman, 62 years old
There is more gruesomely persuasive detail in the press release:
"Pastor Jacob Gadet Manyiel, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, and his wife
and four children were burned to death as the Government soldiers stood
outside their house and threatened to shoot anyone in the family who
tried to escape the flames."
How can this go without investigation? How can the US claim credit for
having created a viable or meaningful Civilian Protection Monitoring
Team when such credible and detailed reports of civilian atrocities do
not meet some bizarrely high evidentiary threshold? How can attacks by
Khartoum's regular military forces---involving murder, abduction, and
wanton physical destruction---be anything but a primary concern of the
CPMT?
Something has deeply, deeply compromised the work of the CPMT. It is
not fulfilling its critically important mandate, and the reason seems to
be an expedient set of calculations made by the new head of CPMT in
Khartoum (General Charles Bauman) and the State Department (primarily
through the charge d'affaires in the Khartoum embassy, Jeff Millington).
The corruption now threatens to destroy utterly the integrity of the
CPMT and its role in restraining Khartoum's savage assaults on
civilians. Inaction by the State Department's Africa Bureau in the face
of this new report---a refusal to demand an investigation---will signal
yet again a failure of moral conviction and a lack of principled
response to Khartoum's ongoing effort to destroy southern civilians and
civil society.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
It is clear that several independent sources have questioned fundamentally the claims made by Christian Solidarity International. The Canadian government’s special envoy has dismissed CSI’s claims of "slave redemption" as unbelievable. Anti-Slavery International has itself questioned several of CSI’s claims. It is now clear that many "slave redemptions" are staged. Independent sources have stated that while some of those outside groups involved in these "redemptions" may have been innocently misled, other outside groups may be purposefully using "slave redemptions" in order to raise money for the SPLA.
As Anti-Slavery International will know, these "slave redemptions" fuel the Sudanese conflict in at least two ways. They echo inaccurate and stereotyped propaganda images of Sudan and the Sudanese conflict which serve only to misinform the international community, which in turn can distort positions taken by countries such as the United States. And, if what credible outside commentators have said is true, the money raised through fraudulent "slave redemptions" is actually used to procure weapons for the SPLA which are then used to prolong the war.
Anti-Slavery International has previously articulated concerns that claims made by Christian Solidarity International "distort reality" and that fuel "indiscriminate and wholly undeserved prejudice against Arabs and Muslims". It is clear that Christian Solidarity International continues to make these claims, that they have gained even more prominence within the United States and that such claims are fuelling an ill-informed anti-Sudanese frenzy in that country. Anti-Slavery International must have the courage to once again urge the international community to exercise the utmost caution in assessing claims made by groups such as Christian Solidarity International.
One of the reasons for the questionable course of American policy
towards Sudan for much of the 1990s - especially during the Clinton
Administration - was the poor standard of what passed for research and
analysis within the United States regarding Sudanese affairs. This
misrepresentation has been within both the private and government
sectors. While one would expect a wide range of personal bias, prejudice
and competence amongst individuals and organisations with their own
private agendas, it is disappointing to note that a similar prejudice
and unprofessionalism has characterised American government
institutions. At the heart of this governmental ineptitude has been the
Congressional Research Service (CRS).
The service describes itself as "the public policy research arm of the
United States Congress" created to provide Congress with "its own source
of nonpartisan, objective analysis and research on all legislative
issues."(1) CRS also specifically states that it seeks to "provide
products and services that can be relied upon to be free of partisan or
other bias" and that are "reliable, current and comprehensive". It is
clear that this has not been the case with regard to its work on Sudan.
Its principal "expert" on Sudan has for some years been Ted Dagne. He
has authored most of Congressional Research Service's documents on
Sudan. They have been noticeably partisan, stale and selective.
Sudan has been wracked by civil war for decades. Since 1983 the war in
the south has been fought against the Government of Sudan by the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA). Congressional Research Service
documents undoubtedly served to underpin the Clinton Administration's
skewed Sudan policy within Congress. (2) No less a commentator than
former President Jimmy Carter was very candid about both the lack of
objectivity in this policy: "If the United States would be reasonably
objective in Sudan, I think that we at the Carter Center and the
Africans who live in the area could bring peace to Sudan. But the United
States government has a policy of trying to overthrow the government in
Sudan." (3) Carter bluntly described Clinton's Sudan policy as the
"biggest obstacle" to peace in Sudan.
It is a conflict that has cost the country dearly in lost lives and
millions of displaced civilians. Dagne's bias towards the SPLA position
is clear. In November 1997, for example, Dagne spoke in a seminar on
Sudan at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Former
Congressman Mervyn Dymally, a past chairman of the House of
Representatives Africa Sub-Committee, said of Dagne's presentation that
instead of an "objective presentation, one would think that Ted
represents the SPLA here." It comes as little surprise that former
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen confirmed
that Dagne was a "good friend" of SPLA leader John Garang, and that
Dagne would host meetings for Garang in his Washington home. (4)
Quite what CRS's analyst is doing singing the praises of the SPLA is
unclear. It is an organisation described by The New York Times as
"brutal and predatory" which has "behaved like an occupying army,
killing, raping and pillaging." (5) Human Rights Watch stated that: "The
SPLA has a history of gross abuses of human rights and has not made any
effort to establish accountability. Its abuses today remain serious".
(6) The New York Times described John Garang as one of Sudan's "pre-
eminent war criminals". (7)
The Congressional Research Service's poor track record on Sudan spans
the 1990s, and has, apart from misanalysis, included the repetition of
undiluted disinformation. An early example were claims that thousands of
Iranian revolutionary guards were present in Sudan. The Congressional
Research Service served as a conduit for this sort of propaganda in the
early 1990s. (8) By 1994, however, 'The Independent' newspaper in London
was reporting that "intelligence assessments...say that reports of
Iranian revolutionary guards [in Sudan]...are without foundation". (9)
This is supported by the memoirs of the former United States ambassador
to Sudan, Donald Petterson, in which he commented on this particular
instance of disinformation:
"Reports appeared in the media that hundreds, even thousands of
Iranians, many of them Revolutionary Guard military and security police
advisers, had come to Sudan. Reports also persisted that the Iranians
were training Palestinian, Egyptian, Algerian, and other radical
Islamist terrorists at sites in Sudan, some of them quite large. The
reports were based in part on information provided by Egyptian
intelligence sources, which were conducting an assiduous disinformation
campaign against Sudan. The truth was something far less alarming. There
were Iranian advisers and technicians in Sudan, and Shiite propagandists
and clerics as well, yet their numbers were relatively small, certainly
nothing like the numbers being reported by the Western press." (10)
The reality is that the number of Iranians of all sorts in Sudan at the
time could be numbered in tens rather than hundreds or thousands. The
"Iranian revolutionary guards" affair was only one of many examples of
questionable claims made about Sudan by the Congressional Research
Service.
Dagne's selectivity, and that of the CRS, regarding Sudan is equally
clear. While reviewing Sudan, "terrorism" and the Clinton years, for
example, Dagne cites Osama bin Laden's stay within Sudan, but does not
mention any of the well-documented offers made by Khartoum to extradite
him to the United States, nor Khartoum's attempts to co-operate in
counter-terrorism, including repeated offers from 1996 onwards to share
information on the bin Laden network. (11) Indeed, he keeps to the
revisionist line, denying that any such offers were made. (12)
In this crass attempt to rewrite history (and to keep doggedly to an
anti-Sudanese line) Dagne ignores the fact that President Clinton's
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger not only publicly admitted that
such an offer was made but went so far as to provide a lame excuse for
not accepting bin Laden. Berger was quoted in 'The Washington Post', for
example, as saying: "In the United States, we have this thing called the
Constitution, so to bring him here is to bring him into the justice
system. I don't think that was our first choice." (13) Even former
President Clinton admitted there had been such an offer, stating that
his Administration's refusal to accept the Sudanese offer was "the
biggest mistake" of his presidency. (14) It is also worth noting that in
his 2002 book on CIA activities in the 1990s, senior CIA officer Robert
Baer also confirmed with regard to bin Laden that Khartoum "offered him
to us on a platter". (15)
Attempts to rewrite history is a constant theme in the Congressional
Research Service's misanalysis of Sudan. Dagne, for example, claimed
that Sudan was involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (16) -
despite this having been denied by the American government. (17) Dagne
also ignored the clear statement made on 30 April 1996 by Ambassador
Philip C. Wilcox Jr, the Department of State's counter-terrorism supremo
it very clear that there was no involvement by Sudan in the World Trade
Center bombings: "We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all
possible clues that there might be some state sponsorship behind the
World Trade Center bombing. We have found no such evidence, in spite of
an exhaustive search, that any state was responsible for that crime.
(18)
Dagne also conspicuously avoids any mention of the al-Shifa fiasco. (19)
In August 1998 the Clinton Administration vividly illustrated the
unreliability of its claims about Sudan. Its cruise missile attack on
the al-Shifa medicine factory in Khartoum followed the murderous
bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The Clinton
Administration erroneously claimed that the factory was owned by Osama
bin-Laden and produced chemical weapons. The Clinton Administration
failed to produce any evidence for these claims, and blocked any
subsequent United Nations inspection of the factory. Every one of the
American claims about the al-Shifa factory subsequently proved to be
false. Independent tests carried out on the factory by a distinguished
American chemist showed no traces of anything associated with chemical
weapons. (20) Agence France Press reported that "Western diplomats in
Khartoum and other analysts have rejected the US claims that the factory
was used for such a purpose". (21) It is now accepted that the attack
was a disastrous blunder by the American government. (22)
Far from seeking "reliable" sources, Dagne's lack of professionalism is
also manifested by his continuing citing of the heavily discredited
Christian Solidarity International (CSI) organisation as a source of
information on Sudan. (23) The reliability of Christian Solidarity
International has long been questioned by independent observers. One of
these was the Canadian government's special envoy to Sudan, John Harker,
who noted that "[R]eports, especially from CSI...were questioned, and
frankly not accepted." (24) The respected human rights expert, and Sudan
specialist, Alex de Waal, while co-director of the human rights group
African Rights, referred to CSI as being "overeager and misinformed"."
(25)
Dagne has even gone so far as to co-author critiques of Sudan policy
with anti-Sudan activists such as Eric Reeves. (26) With people such as
Dagne providing "research" and "analysis" on Sudan to Congress it is
unsurprising that the legislation on Sudan passed by Congress has been
as skewed as it has been. What is surprising is that there was no
apparent oversight on his work. It is equally disappointing that the
Congressional Research Service has clearly not been subject to any
meaningful Congressional scrutiny.
The CRS and people such as Ted Dagne have played their part in
prolonging one of the world's longest-running conflicts. In so doing
they also bear a responsibility for the famine, war and disease that has
devastated Sudan. There is little doubt that the Bush Administration has
now decided on a constructive engagement with Sudan and within the
Sudanese peace process. There is a need for clear, accurate and, above
all, reliable information and analysis on Sudan. The Congressional
Research Service must be held to account for its shaky and partisan
record to date and urged to demonstrate far more professionalism in this
respect.
1. "About CRS", Congressional Research Service website at
http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/whatscrs.html
2. For a critique of the Clinton Administration's Sudan policy, see
David Hoile, 'Farce Majeure: The Clinton Administration's Sudan Policy
1993-2000', The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 2000
(available at www.espac.org).
3. "CARE Seeks Political Fix in Sudan", 'Atlanta Journal-
Constitution', 7 October 1999.
4. Herman J. Cohen, 'Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking
in a Troubled Continent', Macmillan, London, 2000, p.83.
5. "Misguided Relief to Sudan", 'The New York Times', 6 December
1999.
6. "Rights Group Warns US Against Feeding Sudan Rebels", News
Article by Reuters, 14 December, 1999.
7. "Misguided Relief to Sudan", Editorial, 'New York Times', 6
December, 1999.
8. "Sudan: Civil War, Famine, and Islamic Fundamentalism",
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington-DC, 13
September 1993.
9. See, "'Innocent Sudan' Exploits Carlos Case", 'The Independent'
(London), 23 August 1994.
10. Donald Petterson, 'Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and
Catastrophe', Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1999, pp.42-43
11. "The Osama Files", 'Vanity Fair', December 2001, pp 50-55. These
offers had also been documented in "Resentful West Spurned Sudan's Key
Terror Files", 'The Observer' (London), 30 September 2001, and "US
Rejected Sudanese Files on al-Qaeda", 'The Financial Times' (London), 30
November 2001.
12. "Sudan and Terrorism", News Article by Voice of America, 7
October 2002.
13. See, for example, Barton Gellman, "'96 Bin Laden Offer Fell
Through", 'The Washington Post', 3 October 2001 and "In '96 Sudan
Offered to Arrest bin Laden", 'The International Herald Tribune', 4
October 2002.
14. "US Missed Three Chances to Seize Bin Laden", 'The Sunday Times'
(London), 6 January 2002.
15. Robert Baer, 'See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in
the CIA's War on Terrorism', Arrow Books, London, 2002, p.360.
16. Ted Dagne, 'Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism,
and U.S. Policy', Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington-DC, 23 January 2003.
17. See, for example, 'The New York Times', 'The Washington Post',
25 June 1993.
18. 'Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing', Press briefing by
Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr, Washington-DC, 30 April 1996 on US
Government Home Page, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/96043
0.html
19. Dagne's only mention of al-Shifa was in September 1998, when he
followed the Clinton Administration line to the letter, citing the two
or three news articles at the time which repeated the Administration
line, while studiously ignoring the dozens of American and foreign
articles which comprehensively rebutted White House claims about the
factory (See, 'Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and
U.S. Policy', Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington-DC, 4 September 1998).
20. See, "U.S. Evidence of Terror Links to Blitzed Medicine Factory
Was 'Totally Wrong'", Andrew Marshall, 'The Independent' (London), 15
February 1999; "No Trace of Nerve Gas Precursor Found at Bombed Sudan
Plant", 'Chemical & Engineering News', 15 February 1999.
21. "Khartoum Doubtful Over Likelihood of US Strike on Sudan", News
Article by Agence France Press, 16 September 2001.
22. "Clinton Bombed Civilians on Purpose. American Tests Showed No
Trace of Nerve Gas at 'Deadly' Sudan Plant. The President Ordered the
Attack Anyway", 'The Observer' (London), 23 August 1998.
23. Ted Dagne, 'Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism,
and U.S. Policy', Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Washington-DC, 23 January 2003, p.12.
24. John Harker, 'Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a Canadian
Assessment Mission', Prepared for the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Ottawa, January 2000, available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc-foreignp-
3110186-e.pdf, p. 1.
25. Alex de Waal, "Sudan: Social Engineering, Slavery and War",
'Covert Action Quarterly' (Washington-DC), Spring 1997.
26. See, Ted Dagne, Eric Reeves and Roger Winter, 'A Critique of the
CSIS Report on Sudan', 25 February 2001, available at the Africa
Action/Africa Policy Home Page http://www.africaaaaction.org/docs01/sud0
102b.htm. For a critique of the activities of Eric Reeves, see 'The
Return of the "Ugly American": Eric Reeves and Sudan', The European-
Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, November 2000, available at
www.espac.org
Sudan
Latest round of Sudan peace talks end with major issues unresolved
Mediator says agreement unfeasible by end of June.
Sudan's opposition chiefs end Cairo talks on note of unity Pledge to
build consensus for peace.
Rebels accuse Sudanese forces of staging deadly air raids Raids kill 6
rebels, as well as imprisoned government troops.
US urges more effort in Sudan peace process after Powell-Garang meeting
Leaders discussed status and prospects of peace talks.
Sudanese government rejects idea of secular Khartoum in any peace deal
Rejects demand by opposition rebels that Sharia law be abrogated.
By Fr. Carlos Rodriguez
[Father Rodriguez is a member of the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative]
I have heard young men recently coming from rebel captivity in the
Sudan telling stories of Sudanese army officers delivering trucks of
military aid to Mr Joseph Kony. The Sudanese Government, at the official
level, keeps repeating that they have severed links with the LRA, but
the reality on the ground seems to be very different.
Although at the beginning of the Iron Fist operation the LRA fought
fiercely against the Sudanese Armed Forces, it seems that they tried to
reconcile in July 2002. Eyewitnesses have told me of a meeting in Nisitu
at that time in which Mr Kony was given a good amount of military
supplies, and the same sources have indicated that during the battle for
the re-capture of Torit later in November LRA forces (commanded by
Tabuley) fought alongside the Sudanese army against the Sudanese Peoples
Liberation Army.
It may be difficult to convince the LRA to settle for a peaceful
negotiated agreement while somebody at the other side of the border is
calling them to receive a new consignment of arms and ammunition.
The U.S. is prepared to overlook the deaths of 2 million mostly Christian
Sudanese in return for a new strategic relationship with Khartoum, reports
the latest issue of Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.
State Department officials say they are on the verge of removing Sudan from
its list of "terror countries," where it was placed in 1997 by the Clinton
administration.
A glance at the map clarifies Sudan's strategic importance. The country is
close to the new headquarters of the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force
relocated from the Gulf to Djibouti at the entrance to the Red Sea. Another
element of importance is the short distance, of some 250 miles, between
Sudan and Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea. Other advantages are Sudan's
borders with Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, the Congo, Central African
Republic, Libya and Egypt. Sudan is also the largest African country with
some 2.5 million square kilometers, a nation that controls the flow of the
Blue and White Niles, Egypt's lifelines. The confluence of the two rivers
runs through Omdurman, just north of Khartoum.
An Egyptian official who was asked about the surprising change in American
policy said: "In the post-Iraq War reality, it is important for the U.S. to
improve relationships with Sudan and to assist Egypt in her campaign against
militants operating from Sudan and to counter the danger of Wahabi
activities from that country."
A case in point is the May 27 Sudanese raid on a terror training camp in
Kardafan. Four Saudis were killed and other extremists were captured. The
official also stressed that his country is trying, with the help of the
U.S., to arrange a peace accord between the Khartoum government and rebels
in the south and the Nuba mountains. This would enable Sudan to direct more
resources to development and to improve her position in the new American
strategic global deployment.
In this context, Secretary of State Colin Powell met last week with
anti-government leader John Garang and assured him the U.S. would do the
utmost to assist Sudan in the search for a peace accord. However, a new
guerrilla group, Sudan Liberation Movement, said on the same day its units
had destroyed an army battalion near Darfour. Meanwhile, the government,
which had pledged peace, arrested in Khartoum a high-ranking opposition Umma
Party official. Adam Mussa Madibbu was picked up by the Internal Security
Service and is now held "for questioning."
The same day the C-130 landed in Khartoum, Powell and his Sudanese
counterpart, Osman Ismail, met in Washington. The two were talking about a
new era in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Powell
promised his guest the administration would work to remove Sudan from the
list of terrorist countries. This, in turn, would lead to end U.S.
sanctions. Powell was quoted by Sudanese sources as saying the U.S. would do
its utmost to end the 10-year-long civil war that has killed more than 2
million people and created major humanitarian disasters.
The civil war has its roots in religious rivalries between Muslims and
Christians. The population in Sudan is comprised of 50-60 percent Muslims,
about 15 percent Christians and the rest animistic pagans. There are also
inter-tribal rivalries between Arab and pure African tribes. Fifty percent
of the Sudanese perceive themselves as Arabs and the others are Africans of
various origins. The overall population of the Sudan is estimated at close
to 20 million, with at least 115 different languages, 26 of them regarded as
major languages. In the non-Arabic south, English is the common language.
It seems that at this stage the administration is willing to forgive Sudan
for what international relief organizations describe simply as
"atrocities" - a term which includes a variety of problems ranging from
civil rights issues, Islamic religious coercion against non-Muslims and
moderates, child soldiers and slavery.
"At this moment it is suitable for Sudan to agree to anything the U.S.
wants," said a Sudanese journalist.
The new military relationship with the U.S. is regarded as highly important.
The same view is being voiced in Khartoum about the Egyptian-sponsored peace
talks between the government of Sudan and the country's opposition groups.
These are mainly the Sudan's People Liberation Movement, headed by John
Garang and others under the umbrella of the National Democratic Alliance
opposition groups.
Powell heard from his guest that the Khartoum government is determined to
reach a peace agreement no later than at the end of June 2003. He also
pledged that the Muslim government, with the support of the U.S. and Egypt,
will work relentlessly to achieve regional stability. Another important
issue brought up by the Sudanese Foreign Minister was his government's
assurance they would put every effort into abolishing any al-Qaida
activities in the Sudan.
The forceful actions taken by the Sudanese government became evident May 1,
when Egypt's Hosni Mubarak paid a surprise visit to Khartoum. The visit,
which was conducted under strict security measures, was the first by an
Egyptian president following 14 years of tense relationships between the
countries and signals a new era. Sources in Cairo agreed Mubarak's visit was
meant to apply more pressure on Khartoum regarding concessions the Sudanese
opposition had demanded. Egypt presented the Sudanese government with
requests for more compromise on legal issues, the sharing of revenues
accrued through mineral and oil resources, the demand for autonomy in some
regions and for terminating Sudanese-Ugandan military cooperation. This
cooperation is described by the opposition as a direct threat to peace and
stability.
The government in Khartoum re-affirmed its July 2002 declaration that
"Egypt's relationship with Sudan is a question of life and death." By making
this statement, the Sudanese hinted at their historic concern about Egypt's
intentions towards their country. There exists a historic fear of Egypt and
her ambition to control the Sudan to gain larger portions of the Nile water
allocations and the access to fertile lands in and around the Nile basin. An
Israeli intelligence evaluation paper outlines an estimate that Egypt's need
for water until 2010 will increase from the present allocation of 48 million
cubic meters to about 60 million, and that there are four major issues at
stake.
Egypt's total dependence on the Nile and her concern of losing control
over its sources, as well as her influence over Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan.
. Lack of fertile land capable of fulfilling the desperate need for
agricultural resources.
. Rapid population growth at a rate of 2.5 percent annually, which could
reach 60 million in just a few years.
. Lack of suitable areas for housing the growing population.
This issue has been closely monitored by Sudan since her independence in
January 1956, aware that the rapid population growth in her northern
neighbor Egypt and its lack of land suitable for farming is the main issue
in any future Egyptian socio-economic and geo-political plans.
Now, as the U.S. is apparently returning to Sudan, the government in
Khartoum can begin to rely on Washington for securing the country against
any Egyptian threats. Egypt is traditionally the main backgammon player on
the Sudanese board, and at this stage with American "encouragement" looming
in the background, she declared her commitment to respect Sudan's integrity.
The consequences of the Sudanese-U.S. cooperation in the war against terror
increases the importance of U.S. strategies. According to some sources, the
U.S. is eyeing the use of Sudanese air bases and naval facilities, such as
Port Sudan on the Red Sea, as part of her improved relationship with Sudan.
Meanwhile, Sudanese opposition groups continue to meet in Cairo and some of
them declared their readiness to cooperate with the government and to
re-establish a new relationship with Khartoum. On May 28, the Sudanese
opposition said it supports the 2002 Machakos agreement brokered in Kenya.
Those officials said the leader of the Umma Party and the chairman of the
Democratic Federation, Mohammed Othman al-Meighani, and the leader of the
Sudan People's Liberation Army, John Garang, endorsed the agreement and
promised to work toward a peaceful solution. This does not include rebels in
the Darfour region of the Sudan Liberation Movement, who still refuse to
accept any agreement with the Sudanese government.
A major obstacle on the road to peace is the government's refusal to change
the status of Khartoum to a secular administration and its insistence that
Islamic Shari'a remain the law of the capital.
BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; May 31, 2003
The USA has said it is optimistic regarding prospects of putting an end
to the war in southern Sudan following talks in Washington between Col
John Garang, leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement [SPLM],
and US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Meanwhile, the Sudan Liberation
Movement [SLM] announced that 500 soldiers were killed and 300 others
were captured during fierce confrontations in northern Darfur.
SLM Secretary-General Mani Arkoi Minawi told Al-Hayat via satellite
that "fierce confrontations" took place on Thursday [29 May] after
three government units took up positions in Birah, north of Kutum city
in the western Sudanese province of Darfur. Minawi accused the
government forces of killing four citizens and scorching four villages
in an air raid in which the government used Antonov planes. He
said: "The SLM Mandela Brigade launched a sudden offensive on
government forces, killing 500 soldiers, wounding 400 others and taking
300 others prisoner."
Minawi said that once an identification process is completed and the
situation is brought under control, he would "announce the names of the
captives to underline his credibility". He added: "The battle ended at
1510 [local time]." He said that the SLM troops seized seven vehicles,
two trucks, and various weapons and ammunition and destroyed a number
of government vehicles and cannons. [passage omitted]
Source: Al-Hayat, London, in Arabic 30 May 03 p 6
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