Preface
The governance issues addressed in this report are crucial to the
successful establishment in the Southern Sudan of a normally
functioning state. The timing of this report is also important. The
foundations that are laid now will do much to determine the
course, pace and equity of development in the Southern Sudan. The
commissioning of this report (dec2002)by the leadership of the SPLM is
recognition of this fact.READ
MORE.....
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue
London
WC2N 5BW
England
Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), and particularly its president
Baroness Cox, have had a disturbing track record of making unfounded
claims about Sudan.
CSW's president, for example, has previously been described
as
"overeager or misinformed" by reputable human rights activist Alex
de
Waal, with regard to claims about slavery in Sudan. (1) Baroness Cox's
claims that Sudan was involved in chemical weapons have been denied by
the British government and UNSCOM. (2) Her claims about genocide in
Sudan were contradicted by the British government. (3) Even a very
sympathetic biography of Cox records that full-time humanitarian aid
workers in Sudan "feel she is not well-enough informed. She recognizes
a
bit of the picture, but not all that's going on". (4)
In yet one more recent example of "overeager" misinformation,
Christian
Solidarity Worldwide repeated and disseminated claims made by Servant's
Heart, an American church group working in Sudan, that Sudanese
government forces had murdered 59 civilians in attacks on ten villages
in southern Sudan. It was also claimed that government soldiers had
abducted ten children and six women. CSW also reported that Presbyterian
minister Jacob Gadet Manyiel was burned to death together with his wife
and four children. (5)
Sudan has been at war, off and on, since 1955. The Sudanese
conflict has
been marked by a vicious propaganda war. A peace process heavily
influenced by the American State Department has resulted in a ceasefire
throughout southern Sudan for the better part of a year. The sorts of
claims made by Christian Solidarity Worldwide and Servant's Heart have
been made at a critical moment within this peace process, reinforcing
prejudice, mistrust and hatred regarding Sudan - especially within
political and Christian constituencies in the United States.
Previously, many of the claims made against the Government
of Sudan had
been taken at face value. For the first time since the war began,
however, there is now an independent mechanism in place able to
investigate the allegations that have been levelled at the combatants.
As part of the peace process former US Senator John Danforth was
instrumental in ensuring that both the Government and rebels signed an
Agreement to Protect Civilians from Military Attack. This established
the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) to investigate any
allegations of attacks on civilians. The team became operational at the
end of November 2002. The CPMT is funded by the United States
Government, and consists of an international team of experienced
professionals serving as monitors. It is headed by a United States army
brigadier-general.
The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team was able to investigate
the
claims made by Servant's Heart and disseminated by Christian Solidarity
Worldwide.
The Findings of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team conducted on-site
field
investigations in the areas of the incident from 6-10 June and 12-13
June 2003, collecting evidence and interviewing witnesses in Kosti,
Adar, Bolgok, Pagak, Daga Post, Buong, Longochok and its surrounding
villages, and Wan Tau. The CPMT "determined the allegation that the
[Government of Sudan] lead militias forces launched an attack on 27 May
2003 is unsubstantiated. The claim that 59 persons were killed as a
result of this attack is also unsubstantiated. Finally the claim that
the [Government of Sudan] abducted 16 persons was also found to be
unsubstantiated."
The CPMT interviewed with the representatives of Servant's
Heart who had
made the allegation. It reported that "The alleger stated that he
received the information third hand from Pastor John Wiyul. Neither he,
nor Pastor John Wiyul had been to Longochok, Wan Tau or any of the
villages that were attacked to verify the details with the remaining
residents." (6)
With regard to the death of the Presbyterian pastor, the CPMT
concluded
that "the body of evidence... strongly suggests that it was the SPLM/A
and an element of the Fellata not the [Government of Sudan] or its
militia that contributed to the death of Pastor Jacob Manyiel as well as
indeterminate number of people, the displacement of civilians, and the
destruction and looting of civilian property. Although it could not be
conclusively proven that the SPLM/A or the Fellata were respectively
responsible for all of 59 civilians reported to have been killed, there
is eyewitness testimony supporting that each is responsible for an
indeterminate number of the deaths." (emphasis added by CPMT). (7)
It was also ascertained that the Pastor's wife and children
were alive
and well, and that his house had not been burned. Pastor Manyiel had
died of gunshot wounds.
The CPMT called on the rebels and their allies to "refrain
from
targeting or intentionally attacking non-combatants civilians.
[Furthermore] they should take all precautions feasible to avoid the
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and danger to
civilian objects." (8)
Christian Solidarity Worldwide's claims about the Longochok
incident
were wrong on several counts. Any civilians that may have been killed in
any attacks on villages in the area were killed by the rebels or nomads
- not government forces. CSW's sensationalist claims that Pastor Manyiel
and his family were burned alive were burnt alive by government forces
was untrue. Pastor Manyiel was shot to death by rebels or nomads. His
wife and children were not killed: they are alive and well. The Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team revealed that CSW's allegations were made on
the basis of third-hand claims that both it and Servant's Heart had not
taken the trouble to verify.
The fact is that Servant's Heart and Christian Solidarity
Worldwide made
baseless claims about Sudanese government forces. The motivation for
such claims has been independently questioned. It was reported, for
example, that CPMT investigators were privately very critical of these
claims. A CPMT member was said to have referred to its claims about
Longochok as "a pack of lies" and implied that it had been designed
to
"derail the peace process in Sudan". (9) It is true that Servant's
Heart's allegations - allegations which certainly cast the Khartoum
government in a bad light - were made at key phases during the Sudanese
peace process, and may have been designed to adversely effect Sudanese-
American relations. Baroness Cox, the president of Christian Solidarity
Worldwide, used the claims in a similar way, stating that the
allegations had raised "serious questions about the NIF regime's
sincerity of commitment to genuine peace".
With regard to the claims made by Servant's Heart the Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team made the following recommendation: "That all
sources carefully screen future allegations for credibility, source of
information, accuracy, and the feasibility of such an allegation being
truthful so as to cautiously avoid inflaming the situation and reality
on the ground." (10)
The same clearly equally applies to Christian Solidarity Worldwide.
APPENDIX
THE CIVILIAN PROTECTION MONITORING TEAM
Khartoum, Sudan - 30 June 2003
Executive Summary
The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area
On 30 June 2003, The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team released
to the
International Community, the Report of Investigation: Longochok Area.
This investigation was conducted and distributed in accordance with the
"Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement to Protect Non-Combatant Civilians and
Civilian facilities from Military Attacks".
Executive Summary
Allegation:
On 22 May 2003, Government of Sudan (GoS) backed militia forces
attacked
the village of Longochok and nine nearby villages resulting in the
deaths of 59 persons, wounding of an indeterminate number of
individuals, abduction of 16 persons and destruction by burning of an
unknown number of homes (tukuls) in the ten villages
Conduct of Investigation:
Upon receipt of the allegation, the Civilian Protection Monitoring
Team
(CPMT) commenced an investigation. The preliminary investigation was
conducted from Khartoum and consisted of gathering information related
to the allegation. Additional interviews were conducted with persons in
Khartoum and via the telephone to sources in the Eastern Upper Nile
Region reported to have knowledge of the alleged incident.
On-site field investigations were conducted 6 - 10 June and
12-13 June
2003. During this phase of investigation, the CPMT deployed to the areas
of the incident, collected evidence and interviewed witnesses in Kosti,
Adar, Bolgok, Pagak, Daga Post, Buong, Longochok and its surrounding
villages, and Wan Tau.
Results of the Investigation:
The CPMT determined the allegation that the GoS lead militias
forces
launched an attack on 27 May 2003 is unsubstantiated. The claim that 59
persons were killed as a result of this attack is also unsubstantiated.
Finally the claim that the GoS abducted 16 persons was also found to be
unsubstantiated.
Based on the body of evidence the CPMT strongly suggests that
it was the
SPLM/A and an element of the Fellata not the GoS or its militia that
contributed to the death of Pastor Jacob Manyiel as well as
indeterminate number of people, the displacement of civilians, and the
destruction and looting of civilian property. Although it could not be
conclusively proven that the SPLM/A or the Fellata were respectively
responsible for all of 59 civilians reported to have been killed, there
is eyewitness testimony supporting that each is responsible for an
indeterminate number of the deaths.
A formal report was prepared and submitted to the parties.
The CPMT
continues to investigate additional allegations of incidents reportedly
occurring in the Longochok area. Further Information: Persons or
organizations wishing a full copy of the Report of Investigation:
Longochok Area, may download the report from the CPMT web site:
http://www.cpmtsudan.org or may request a copy through: CPMT Operations
Center, Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Grand Holiday Villa Hotel,
Suite 238, Khartoum, Sudan.
Notes
1 De Waal was formerly a co-director of African Rights. Before
that he had worked with 'Africa Watch'. He is an acknowledged expert on
Sudan.
2 'House of Lords Official Report', 19 March 1998, cols. 818-820.
3 'House of Lords Official Report', 10 December 1998, Written
Answers, column 103.
4 Andrew Boyd, 'Baroness Cox: A Voice for the Voiceless', Lion
Publishing, Oxford, 1998, p.324.
5 See, for example, "Latest News from Sudan", Christian Solidarity
Worldwide website http://www.csw.org.uk and claims in "Christian Leader
Burned to Death with Wife and Four Children as 59 People Killed", News
Article by Assist News Service, California, 5 June 2003.
6 'The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area', Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
7 Executive Summary, 'The Report Of Investigation: Longochok
Area', Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
8 'The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area', Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
9 Comments reported in "Three Abductees Killed in Government of
Sudan Captivity", Press Release by Servant's Heart, 11 June 2003.
10 'The Report Of Investigation: Liang, Dengaji, Kawaji, And Yawagi
Villages', Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 19 June 2003.
Khartoum Refuses to Negotiate in Good Faith"
Eric Reeves
September 16, 2003
A series of highly reliable reports from Nairobi, from Naivasha
(Kenya), and elsewhere in the region strongly suggest that this last
round of Machakos/IGAD peace talks has stalemated, and that the
Khartoum regime is no longer negotiating consistently or in good faith.
Rather,the regime's diplomatic and political presence is seriously divided
within itself, on matters of both procedure and substance, and is
increasingly prone to reneging on parts of a final peace settlement
previously agreed to. Critically, this is true of the fundamental
"security issues" that appeared to have been largely resolved last
week.
Talks between the First Vice President of the National Islamic Front,
Ali Osman Taha, and SPLM/A leader John Garang had until this past
weekend seemed highly promising, but now appear to be on the verge of
collapse. There are two possible ways to construe the internal
disagreements on the part of the NIF regime that are playing out in
the form of the present negotiating stalemate. They may reflect a
serious power struggle between the "factions" of Taha and President
Omer
Beshir---or they may simply be part of an elaborately scripted
process by which the regime is attempting to collapse the talks in the most
ambiguous fashion possible. The point of such an exercise in
ambiguity would be to deflect as much criticism as possible. This latter
possibility would certainly be entirely in character for the National
Islamic Front, which has shown extraordinary resourcefulness in the
past in avoiding the diplomacy and negotiations necessary for a just
peace.
If the first is the case---if the tensions between Taha and President
Omer Beshir are playing out in the form of a fractured negotiating
posture---then the IGAD mediators, the US and other international
parties to the talks need urgently to apply the pressure that will
result in a coherent NIF negotiating presence in Naivasha. Various
other Khartoum actors must also be vigorously pressed to support
unambiguously what is being negotiated in Naivasha. This includes
not only Taha and Beshir, but other NIF heavyweights, including Nafie Ali
Nafie (presently at the talks), Qutbi al-Mahdi, Mutrif al-Siddiq
(also presently at the talks), Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail, Ghazi Saleh
el-din Atabani (formerly Beshir's chief peace negotiator), Defense
Minister Bakri Hassan Salih (also presently at the talks), and the
powerful NIF army generals (some of whom are at the talks).
It has long been known that there are serious divisions within the
NIF regime, not so much over ideology and ambitions, but over tactics and
strategy. But this fact cannot allow Khartoum to escape its
overriding international obligation to negotiate a just peace in the context
of
the best opportunity for such a settlement in a generation. Whatever its
divisions, Khartoum must be put forcefully on notice that the regime
will bear collective responsibility for the failure of the
Machakos/IGAD process. To the extent that these divisions are a reflection
of
competition for "credit" in securing peace---and thus for "legitimacy"
in a post-war Sudan---both Taha and Beshir, as well as other members
of the NIF, must be told pointedly that responsibility for success or
failure will be apportioned collectively.
Presently the talks between Khartoum and the SPLM/A are largely
unwitnessed by third-party observers. If real progress were being
generated as a result of this procedure, it might be justified. But
there are now many signs that what last week appeared to be evidence
of progress is being dissipated by NIF factionalism. In turn,
negotiated agreements on outstanding issues, most notably security issues,
are
proving meaningless. In order to forestall the possibility that NIF
internal dissension may collapse the talks, negotiations must be
witnessed by those who can hold the regime collectively accountable
for commitments made. Khartoum must be made to understand that all who
purport to represent the regime in offering and accepting concessions
and in making key agreements will be held responsible for speaking on
behalf of the entire NIF.
If, on the other hand, the regime is simply contriving an apparent
internal dissention in order to collapse the talks in the most
confusing fashion possible, then witnesses to the talks at this stage become
even
more urgently necessary. Chief among these must be the US, if only
because it is the US that will have the greatest ability and most
responsibility for seeing that Khartoum faces the severest
consequences for this duplicitous response to the best opportunity for ending
Sudan's catastrophically destructive civil war.
Real US engagement at this point---as opposed to the stand-off
diplomacy that seems to define present thinking---must occur
immediately. It must be impossible for Khartoum to avoid making the
difficult decisions needed for peace simply because Washington is
largely ignorant of NIF tactics and strategy for collapsing the
Machakos/IGAD talks.
Indeed, so clear is US responsibility at this juncture, so close are
the talks to collapse, that a refusal to act decisively must be held
as a major foreign policy failure on the part of the Bush
administration. To be sure, we must acknowledge the multiple challenges of
a
difficult aftermath in Iraq, of a foundering Middle East peace process, of
nuclear weapons ambitions in North Korea and Iran, as well as an
international war on terrorism.
But this cannot mean that the Bush administration somehow receives a
"pass" for not exerting every US effort to insure that the
Machakos/IGAD peace process for Sudan has a chance to succeed---or to
register clearly and unambiguously US understanding of the causes of
any negotiating failure. The stakes in human terms in Sudan are simply
too high to relegate the Machakos/IGAD peace process to afterthought
diplomacy.
In turn, no electoral assessment of the Bush administration foreign
policy will be possible in 2004 that does not take fully into account
the success or failure in achieving peace for Sudan. This remains
the moment of truth, even as that truth appears to be Khartoum's barbaric
willingness to resume the world's most destructive conflict: how will
the administration respond? From a humanitarian and moral
perspective, Americans will have few more consequential foreign policy issues
on
which to judge President Bush and his State Department.
What should be clearest to the administration and the State
Department is that it is not enough simply to observe developments from afar:
the US must act decisively now, both to observe at close quarters
Khartoum's negotiating behavior and to make fully clear the consequences of
their collapsing the talks, whether through internal dissention within the
regime or the contrivance of such "dissention." The brutal
oligarchs of the National Islamic Front must either agree to make peace with
the
people of the south, or they must all face a full array of the
severest consequences---diplomatic, economic, and financial.
In particular, the US must lead aggressive efforts to deny Khartoum
all credit and loan opportunities through the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and World Bank. These international financial institutions,
particularly the IMF, have for too long ignored the clear realities
of Khartoum's use of oil revenues to prosecute the war in southern
Sudan, Darfur, and other marginalized areas of the country. It is a
travesty of all that the IMF and World Bank are supposed to represent that
Khartoum enjoys any assistance whatsoever as long as long as its
budgetary priorities are defined by military ambitions, ambitions
that have resulted in unfathomable human destruction. Certainly with a
massive external debt---exceeding $22 billion---the regime is much
more vulnerable to financial and credit pressures than is generally
acknowledged.
But there must be clear international leadership if this source of
pressure on the regime is to be utilized effectively. Dismayingly,
the
most recent IMF report (June 4, 2002) gives a thoroughly whitewashed
assessment of Khartoum's management of the economy. All too
revealingly, there is not a single line item---in 60 pages of text
and charts---that speaks to Khartoum's military expenditures, even as
these expenditures are most consequential in defining the performance of
the overall economy, in all ways. This deliberate and calculated
blindness must be ended, and Khartoum brought face to face with its financial
vulnerabilities.
[Though the World Bank has no active lending portfolio in Sudan
becauseof Khartoum's default on it financial obligations to the Bank, there
isstill room for a further tightening. Bank staff, for example, should
suspend all contacts with the Khartoum regime over the Gezira
Irrigation Scheme; see page 57 of the IMF June 4, 2003 report.]
Khartoum must also confront the prospect of an enforced "no-fly zone"
in southern Sudan that will insure unfettered, unhindered, and
unthreatened humanitarian relief. The international community simply
must not allow the resumption of war to signal the start of yet
another assault by Khartoum on desperately needed food and medical
assistance in southern Sudan.
The alternatives are peace or war---nothing else will emerge from
Naivasha. It is the immediate, urgent moral responsibility of the
United States to signal to Khartoum the consequences of a decision
not to make peace.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
AMERICAN CHRISTIANS GRAVELY MISLED ON SUDAN
Introduction
There is clear, independently-sourced, evidence that American Churches
and Christians are being grievously misled with regard to the situation
in Sudan. On more than one occasion American church groups such as
Servant's Heart have made very serious claims about Sudanese government
forces which were subsequently proved untrue. Sudan has been at war, off
and on, since 1955. It has been a conflict marked by often vicious
propaganda. Inaccurate or distorted claims are dangerous at any time.
They are particularly regrettable during the current critical phase
within the Sudanese peace process. At a time when the focus has been on
reconciliation these allegations have focused prejudice, mistrust and
hatred regarding Sudan - especially within political and religious
constituencies in the United States.
Previously, many of the claims - especially against the Government of
Sudan - had been taken at face value by the public and media at large.
In so doing they have grotesquely distorted perceptions of Sudanese
affairs within the United States. For the first time since the war
began, however, there is now an independent mechanism in place able to
investigate the allegations that have been levelled at the combatants.
As part of the peace process initiated by former Senator John Danforth,
the United States Department of State was instrumental in ensuring that
both the Government and rebels signed an Agreement to Protect Civilians
from Military Attack. This established the Civilian Protection
Monitoring Team (CPMT) to investigate any allegations of attacks on
civilians. The team was became operational at the end of November 2002.
The CPMT is funded by the United States Government, and consists of an
international team of experienced professionals serving as monitors. It
is headed by a United States army brigadier-general.
The team's executive summaries and full reports can be viewed and
downloaded from the CPMT website: http://www.cpmtsudan.org
Servant's Heart's Allegation Number 1:
The Murder of 2000-3000 Civilians in Attacks on Villages
In February 2003, Dennis Bennett, the director of Servant's Heart, made
a number of very serious allegations against the Government of Sudan.(1)
His organisation, together with the Canadian groups Freedom Quest
International and The Voice of the Martyrs, claimed that Sudanese armed
forces had massacred between two and three thousand Sudanese civilians
in attacks on the villages of Liang, Dengaji, Kawaji and Yawaji in late
April 2002. It was claimed that there were fields littered with human
remains. These allegations were widely disseminated internationally and
especially within the United States.(2) They were cited by groups such
as the Ministerial Alliance of Midland, Texas, a coalition of Church
groups and individuals in President Bush's hometown.(3) The Ministerial
Alliance of Midland, Texas refers to Servant's Heart, Freedom Quest
International and The Voice of the Martyrs as "coalition partners".
In their press release these three groups called for "an investigation
by the international Civilian Protection and Monitoring Team." (4) The
CPMT did just that.
The Findings of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
The CPMT conducted two on-site field investigations at the coordinates
provided. Interviews with villagers and rebels within these areas.
The CPMT determined that there had been government activity in the area
in April 2002, and that approximately 20-30 people had been killed. The
CPMT found that "These actions may have occurred in response to actions
by the SPLM/A in the killing of two (2) civilians, looting and robbery
of cattle and sheep in the Basholi area in early January and February
2002." These were said to be common in the region.
The CPMT found the evidence of 4-5 human remains in one location and
another 4-5 remains at another location. It was noted that the latter
location had been a battlefield and it was concluded that "It is highly
likely that the human remains at this location are those of combatants
who fought at this site".
The CPMT stated: "The claim, therefore that up to '2,500 people were
killed' has not been substantiated." (5)
The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team made a point of recommending:
"That all sources carefully screen future allegations for credibility,
source of information, accuracy, and the feasibility of such an
allegation being truthful so as to cautiously avoid inflaming the
situation and reality on the ground." (6)
Servant's Heart Allegation Number 2:
The Murder of 59 Civilians and Burning Alive of a Presbyterian Pastor
In early June 2003, Dennis Bennett and Servant's Heart made further
serious allegations against the Sudanese government. He claimed that the
Sudanese military had murdered 59 civilians in attacks on ten villages
in eastern Upper Nile. Bennett also claimed a Presbyterian pastor, his
wife and four children were burned alive by Sudanese soldiers. (7)
Servant's Heart also claimed that Sudanese government forces had
abducted 16 women and children. These allegations were widely
disseminated within the United States and internationally. (8) These
allegations were made as improved Sudanese-American relations were being
discussed.
The Findings of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team conducted on-site field
investigations in the areas of the incident from 6-10 June and 12-13
June 2003, collecting evidence and interviewing witnesses in Kosti,
Adar, Bolgok, Pagak, Daga Post, Buong, Longochok and its surrounding
villages, and Wan Tau. The CPMT "determined the allegation that the
[Government of Sudan] lead militias forces launched an attack on 27 May
2003 is unsubstantiated. The claim that 59 persons were killed as a
result of this attack is also unsubstantiated. Finally the claim that
the [Government of Sudan] abducted 16 persons was also found to be
unsubstantiated."
The CPMT interviewed with the representatives of Servant's Heart who had
made the allegation. It reported that "The alleger stated that he
received the information third hand from Pastor John Wiyul. Neither he,
nor Pastor John Wiyul had been to Longochok, Wan Tau or any of the
villages that were attacked to verify the details with the remaining
residents." (9)
With regard to the death of the Presbyterian pastor, the CPMT concluded
that "the body of evidence ... strongly suggests that it was the SPLM/A
and an element of the Fellata NOT the [Government of Sudan] or its
militia that contributed to the death of Pastor Jacob Manyiel as well as
indeterminate number of people, the displacement of civilians, and the
destruction and looting of civilian property. Although it could not be
conclusively proven that the SPLM/A or the Fellata were respectively
responsible for all of 59 civilians reported to have been killed, there
is eyewitness testimony supporting that each is responsible for an
indeterminate number of the deaths." (emphasis added by CPMT). (10)
It was also ascertained that the Pastor's wife and children were alive
and well, and that his house had not been burned. Pastor Manyiel had
died of gunshot wounds.
The CPMT called on the rebels and their allies to "refrain from
targeting or intentionally attacking non-combatants civilians.
[Furthermore] they should take all precautions feasible to avoid the
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and danger to
civilian objects." (11)
Conclusion
The reliability of claims made by Servant's Heart, Freedom Quest
International and The Voice of the Martyrs was thus examined by the
independent Civilian Protection Monitoring Team for all to see. It was
an investigation for which they had all called.
Servant's Heart's claims that between two and three thousand civilians
in the Liang, Dengaji, Kawaji and Yawagi areas were murdered by
government forces were unfounded. The CPMT were able to find 8-10 human
remains, half of which may have been those of soldiers killed in battle.
With regard to its claims about the Longochok area Servant's Heart was
wrong on several counts. Any civilians that may have been killed in any
attacks on villages in the area were killed by the rebels or nomads -
not government forces. Servant's Heart's sensationalist claims that
Pastor Manyiel and his family were burned alive by government forces was
untrue. Pastor Manyiel was killed by rebels or nomads. His wife and
children are alive and well. The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team
revealed that Servant's Heart made its very grave accusations on the
basis of third-hand claims that it had not taken the trouble to verify.
The fact that the very serious claims about Sudan that Servant's Heart,
and others, saw fit to make were subsequently shown to be essentially
baseless is disturbing enough. The motivation for such claims has also
been questioned. It was reported, for example, that CPMT investigators
were privately very critical of the claims made by Servant's Heart. A
CPMT member was said to have referred to its claims about Longochok as
"a pack of lies" and implied that it had been designed to "derail
the
peace process in Sudan". (12) It is true that Servant's Heart's
allegations - allegations which certainly cast the Khartoum government
in a bad light - were made at key phases during the Sudanese peace
process, and may have been intentionally designed to adversely effect
Sudanese - American relations. (13)
The CPMT's conclusions about the claims made by Servant's Heart, Freedom
Quest International and The Voice of the Martyrs can only but call into
question many of the previous assertions about Sudan made by these
church groups and similar organisations. These have been similar in tone
to the discredited claims. (14)
The interest shown by American churches and Christians in the Sudan is
very welcome. With this interest, however, comes a clear responsibility
to the truth. Propaganda and distortion is the hallmark of any conflict,
and particularly civil war. Sudan has been no exception. If the claims
made by groups such as Servant's Heart, Freedom Quest International and
The Voice of the Martyrs are anything to go by, then American Christian
perceptions of the Sudanese situation may well have been distorted.
Peace and reconciliation needs truth and clarity. This must be demanded
of those organisations and individuals claiming to inform the outside
world about Sudan.
Notes
1 "International Team Uncovers Killing Fields in South Sudan",
Press Release by Servant's Heart, 6 February 2003. Servant's heart
describes itself as "a parachurch organization" funded by "churches
of
various denomination, families, individuals, and schools in the US and
Canada" (See Servant's Heart website: http://servantsheartrelief.org).
2 See, for example, "Sudan. Killing Fields Discovered in Southern
Sudan", News Article by Zenith News Agency, The Vatican, Italy, 10
February 2003; "Discovery of Mass Graveyard Uncovers Massacre of
Christians in Unarmed Villages by Sudanese Army. Christian Agencies Join
Together in Calling for International Inquiry", Press Release by
Evangelical Alliance Media Consultancy, 11 February 2003; "International
Team Uncovers Killing Fields in South Sudan", Persecution Report,
Mission Network News, 18 February 2003.
3 "Open Letter to the Government of Sudan", Ministerial Alliance
of Midland Texas, Midland, 7 March 2003.
4 This claim was clearly designed and timed to influence the Sudan
Peace Act. The organisations specifically called upon "the US State
Department to include this incident in their Sudan Peace Act-mandated
report to Congress on atrocities and war criminals in Southern Sudan."
These groups clearly wished to see the punitive clauses of the Sudan
Peace Act to be enacted. Drafted towards the end of the Clinton
Administration, the Sudan Peace Act encapsulated every negative aspect
of the Clinton Administration's policy towards Sudan - a policy
described by former President Carter: "The people in Sudan want to
resolve the conflict. The biggest obstacle [was] US government
policy...Any sort of peace effort [was] aborted, basically by policies
of the United States...Instead of working for peace in Sudan, the US
government...basically promoted a continuation of the war." "Carter,
Others Say US Has Faltered in Africa", "The Boston Globe",
8 December
1999. The grotesquely-misnamed Sudan Peace Act perpetuates these
policies. For a detailed critique, see "The 'Sudan Peace Act':
Perpetuating Africa's Longest War", The European-Sudanese Public Affairs
Council, London, June 2001, available at http://www.espac.org
5 Executive Summary, "The Report Of Investigation: Liang, Dengaji,
Kawaji and Yawagi Villages", Civilian Protection Monitoring Team,
Khartoum, 19 June 2003.
6 "The Report Of Investigation: Liang, Dengaji, Kawaji, And Yawagi
Villages", Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 19 June 2003.
7 "Government of Sudan Military Kills 59 Unarmed Villagers,
Watches While Family Burns to Death, Violates Ceasefire While Bush
Administration Does Nothing", Press Release by Servant's Heart, 3 June
2003.
8 See, for example, "Islamists Burn to Death Christian Pastor,
Family. Massacre of 59 Came as Sudan Discussed Removal from Terror
List", News Article by World Daily Net, 4 June 2003; "Christian
Leader
Burned to Death with Wife and Four Children", News Article by ANS, 5
June 2003; "Sudan's Islamic Government Continues Persecuting
Christians", News Briefing by Christian World News, Christian
Broadcasting Network, 13 June 2003; and Nat Hentof, "The Fight Against
Genocide and Slavery;Sudan Government Breaks Faith with President Bush",
"The Washington Times", 23 June 2003.
9 "The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area", Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
10 Executive Summary, "The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area",
Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
11 "The Report Of Investigation: Longochok Area", Civilian
Protection Monitoring Team, Khartoum, 30 June 2003.
12 Comments reported in "Three Abductees Killed in Government of
Sudan Captivity", Press Release by Servant's Heart, 11 June 2003.
13 If the aim was to adversely influence perceptions of the
government's commitment to the peace process it had its successes. See,
for example, the statement made by Baroness Cox, president of Christian
Solidarity Worldwide, that Servant's Heart's Longochok allegations
"raise serious questions about the NIF regime's sincerity of commitment
to genuine peace" ("Christian Leader Burned to Death with Wife and
Four
Children", News Article by ANS, 5 June 2003) and the statement made by
Release International, a Christian advocacy group, that they were "the
clearest evidence yet that the Sudanese authorities are not serious
about the peace talks they are engaged in. That atrocities of this
magnitude are occuring in the midst of such negotiations, is pure
hypocrisy."
14 See, for example, "Sudan Jihad Forces Islam on Christians. Women
Refusing to Convert Gang-Raped, Mutilated, Says Relief Worker", News
Article by World Net Daily, 4 March 2002. The relief worker cited by
Dennis Bennett.
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SPLM/SPLA
(September 4, 2003).
I have just arrived Nairobi on my way to Naivasha, to meet with Mr Ali Osman Mohammed Taha, 1st Vice President of the Government of Sudan (GOS).
This meeting is organized by the IGAD (mediation) Secretariat and the Government of Kenya, which chairs the IGAD sub-committee on the Sudan conflict, which had scheduled the meeting to be between September 2nd and 5th 2003. I am going to the meeting with an open heart and mind in search of peace and justice for my people.
The people of Sudan have suffered so much and for so long because of bad governance and discrimination on the basis of religion and race, and from policies of political and economic marginalization pursued by various Khartoum-based governments, and from the civil wars that resulted.
Time has come to resolve the Sudan conflict. The two parties (The GOS and the SPLM/A) have negotiated throughout the past 14 years under IGAD mediation. It is enough, and it is now time for the process to show some tangible results.
In July last year, the parties signed the Machakos Protocol as a framework for resolving among other issues the two basic issues (of the conflict), the right of self-determination and the relation between State and Religion. Since then and for more than one year, the parties were involved in negotiating the details, leading to the Nakuru Framework document, in which the mediators presented proposals for the resolution of the outstanding issues arising from the Machakos Protocol.
The SPLM/SPLA has accepted the Nakuru Framework document as the basis to negotiate a final agreement. The rejection by the GOS of the Nakuru Draft Framework document has caused deadlock to the talks. This is threatening the whole IGAD peace process with collapse.
We are going to Naivasha to save the process from collapsing, to resolve the dead lock so that the parties negotiate on the basis of the Draft Framework for the resolution of the outstanding issues presented by the mediators.
The parties have negotiated enough and time has come for decision-making. I and my team are going to Naivasha ready and prepared to take tough decisions to bring a just peace to Sudan. Because of the importance of the matter and SPLM/A’s commitment to peace, we have left a very important SPLA Senior Officers’ Conference involving more than 2,000 officers of the rank Lt. Col. and above, to come for this meeting. We have the full mandate of the SPLM Leadership Council and the Senior Officers’ Conference to take the necessary decisions to bring the war to an end through a just and fair political settlement. We expect Mr Ali Osman Mohammed Taha and the GOS delegation to have the courage to make the required decisions, to accept change and the inevitable transition to peace and democracy. Peace has a price that must be paid, as it has a dividend that will be enjoyed by the whole Sudanese people and shared by the parties.
The SPLM is committed and prepared to negotiate in good faith. We want a just peace now and we are ready to make it.
Finally, the SPLM received news over the media that the Darfur-based Sudan Liberation Movement and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM/SLA) and the Government of Sudan (GOS) have agreed to sign a cease fire agreement in the town of Abeche in Eastern Chad. The SPLM/SPLA welcomes this as a step in the right direction and commends President Idris Debi’s mediation role in the search for peace in Darfur and Sudan. We have always called on the GOS to recognize that the problem in Western Sudan is political not armed robbery as they used to call it, and that it can only be resolved by dialogue and negotiations. The SPLM/A urges all the Sudanese political forces to enter into discussions with the SLM/A and to support the expected talks between the SLM/A and the GOS, so as to bring a comprehensive resolution to the Sudanese conflict.
Signed,
Cdr/Dr John Garang De Mabior,
Chairman and C-in-C, SPLM/A.